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 The purpose of the current investigations was to examine the effects of the amount of voice one 
is given during decision-making on group behaviors. In particular, across two studies, participants were 
members of groups that needed to make a decision. In these situations, participants were provided 
varying degrees of voice during a decision-making process. Depending on the study, participants were 
either given a direct voice (Personal Voice), an indirect voice (Group Voice), a direct voice and an 
indirect voice (Composite Voice), or were not allowed a voice (No Voice). The results of Study 1 
found that having Personal Voice or Composite Voice is related to increased perceptions of control, 
trust, and certainty, and is related to more predicted effort put forth for the group. In contrast, having 
Group Voice or No Voice was shown to be related to low levels of control, trust, and certainty. 
Furthermore, Group Voice was related to less predicted effort given toward achieving group goals.  
The findings of Study 1 suggest that the reason more voice is related to more positive group effort is 
because of how trust in the decision-maker is positively related to being more certain of what that 
decision-maker will do, which in turn predicts more certainty of how the decision will affect one’s self 
as a member of the group in the future. The results of Study 2 found that Personal Voice was related to 
increased perceptions of voice and certainty, with Group Voice and No Voice related to low levels of 
certainty. Interestingly, Study 2 found that more voice given to group members was related to less 
behavioral output on behalf of the group. The relationship between having more voice and less effort 
was explained by perceptions of certainty. The findings of the current research suggest that groups 
must take care to ensure their members are treated in a fair manner because there are both benefits and 
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Are All Voices Created Equal?: Conditional Indirect Effects of Directness of 
One’s Voice on Perceived Uncertainty and Performance 
The purpose of the current set of investigations is to examine to what extent various forms of 
procedural justice affect group members' perceptions and beliefs in ways that either promote or hinder 
cooperation. Understanding the notion of justice has interested scholars for centuries (Colquitt, 
Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005), and defining the concept of procedural justice has been an activity 
of psychological and organizational researchers for over 40 years.  In those years, a vast literature has 
emerged providing evidence of the positive relationships procedural justice has with people’s attitudes 
and behaviors, such as increased feelings of respect (Blader & Tyler, 2009; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; 
Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992), strongly identifying with one’s organization (Tyler & 
Blader, 2000), increased commitment to one’s group (e.g., Jones, Scarpello, & Bergmann, 1999; 
Konovsky, Folger, & Cropanzano, 1987; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), feeling confident one is not 
being exploited by group authorities (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002), and behavioral engagement with 
one’s group (e.g., cooperation; Tyler & Blader, 2003) 
Given the vast amount of literature conducted in the past on procedural justice, it is important to 
be clear as to the definition/operationalization of this construct to be used in the current investigations.  
Procedural justice has previously been judged to be present and/or operationalized when procedures are 
consistent, unbiased, accurate, correctable, and/or ethical (for review see Colquitt et al., 2005).  
However, Tyler and Lind (2000) propose a broad definition of procedural justice in that justice exists if 
the measures and social processes by which decisions are made and/or the method by which rules are 
enforced are perceived to be fair.  Within Tyler and Lind’s (2000) definition, if procedural justice is 
said to involve social processes by which decisions are made, then the inclusion or exclusion of 
individual opinions during a group decision-making process may become important in people’s 





group decisions were arrived at in an all-inclusive manner. Tyler and Lind’s definition of procedural 
justice suggests that an important factor in individual’s sense of justice may be whether or not one is 
given a voice during group decision-making.   
Procedural Justice as Voice 
 
Group members are said to experience a fair course of action when included in a group’s 
decision-making process by being allowed to voice opinions, with the hope that the ultimate decision 
made may support one’s interests and goals.  This general definition of procedural justice will be the 
focus of the current investigations.  This broad idea of having voice as a signal of justice was a major 
theme in the early organizational justice research.  Early operationalizations of procedural justice 
involved manipulating whether participants had a sense that they were able to control the process by 
which they received outcomes.  Having control is desirable due to the sense that one can receive what 
one desires, such as a group decision that benefits one’s self-interests.  Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) 
seminal work focused on dispute resolutions and found those who were given a chance to contribute to 
the resolution process (i.e., voicing one’s concerns to the decision makers) were more satisfied with the 
outcome of the decision than those who were not given a chance to contribute.  Similar results have 
been found regarding satisfaction of decisions, in addition to increased acceptance of such decisions 
(e.g., Peterson, 1999; Ståhl, Van Prooijen, & Vermunt, 2004; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998), and 
willingness to then cooperate (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994). 
If all affected parties involved are given a chance to contribute in the decision-making process, 
the outcomes for everyone may be more attractive and beneficial by way of the synthesis of all relevant 
information.  Voicing one’s concerns “serves the cause of equity because it gathers information directly 
from the parties to the dispute” (Tyler & Lind, 2000, p. 70).  Those who voice their opinions are said to 
have both “process control” and “outcome control,” in that they hold an amount of sway over the 





decisions made, respectively (Shapiro & Brett, 2005).  
Although opportunities for having a direct voice are quite common, they do not represent all 
possible situations under which voice may be given.  Equally important situations exist where direct 
member input is unlikely or impossible, such as during intergroup decision-making (e.g., political-party 
policy making at the national level).  In those circumstances, a group representative of member 
interests is given a voice during decision-making.  Giving each individual group member a direct voice 
in decisions in such a situation may be impractical and unmanageable.  However, individual members 
may still believe their interests are taken into account in these circumstances by having an indirect 
voice during the process (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2010).  Therefore, it is important to 
make a conceptual distinction between two methods of experiencing voice: personal voice and group 
voice.        
Personal Voice or Group Voice 
What has consistently been defined as voice (e.g., Shapiro & Brett, 2005; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975) can more precisely be termed personal voice (Terwel et al., 2010): every person can have a 
direct say in group decisions.  Personal voice has its limitations.  If personal voice was provided to 
members of a relatively large group, then the decision-making process may quickly suffer.  As the size 
of the group increases, so does the number of varying self-serving opinions needing to be accounted 
for, resulting in the decreased likelihood of reaching a satisfying decision for all involved.  Members 
may also not be able to experience personal voice due to time constraints; large groups have too many 
members voicing opinions to the point time runs out, and a decision must be made before one’s 
personal voice can be heard.  Additionally, members of a large group may hold dissimilar beliefs and 
goals, thus naturally dividing into subgroups supporting the various viewpoints on the matter at hand; 
the initial intragroup decision-making process may quickly become more inter(sub)group.  A decision 





compromise (perhaps a form of subgroup-ingroup bias; Brewer, 2007; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006).  Consequently, the decision-making process may 
be interrupted by such tangential, self-serving competition, and members may never be able to have the 
opportunity to have direct input.   
Terwel et al. (2010) studied the concept of group voice to understand how providing the 
opportunity for voice can work within groups where personal voice is not an option (e.g., with 
relatively large numbers of members competing to be heard).  Terwel et al. define group voice as the 
“opportunity for interest groups to express their opinions in decision-making processes” (p. 174) on 
behalf of a larger population that is unable to have a direct voice.  In other words, a select few are given 
a voice to express the opinions on behalf of the needs and interests of the many.  
Such representation can take various forms, allowing for the experience of group voice to occur 
in a variety of circumstances.  Fellow ingroup members may serve on a committee to make decisions 
within the group.  Group voice may also exist if a group authority expresses the interests of the group 
to a mediating third-party during intergroup interactions.  Common to both intergroup and intragroup 
decision-making is the idea that individual group members’ voices being expressed are indirect, or 
implied, for the individual members (Terwel et al., 2010). Despite Terwel and colleagues’ focus on a 
group of representatives providing a voice for a sub-group population, it is possible the psychological 
experience of group voice may be more easily understood as believing one's interests are being voiced 
although not being able to provide personal input. Therefore, to more easily test the personal effects of 
group voice in the current investigations, the presence of a single individual serving as one's 
representative voice was used. 
Composite Voice. A variation on group voice may involve individual group members 
experiencing personal voice prior to, and in conjunction with, experiencing group voice (a hybrid of the 





members may give in order to influence the representative’s voice.  In reality, it may be much more 
common for all group members (representative included) to meet and allow every member an 
opportunity to voice his or her opinions directly to the representative, who would then be sent to the 
decision-makers to voice the now agreed upon opinion of the group as a whole.  Therefore, the 
experience of group voice may sometimes be preceded by an experience of personal voice (i.e., 
composite voice).  The question remains as to which experience of voice, personal or group, may 
dominate the effects on perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors, or would emergent effects be found based 
on the interaction of the two distinct forms of voice? Composite voice may represent a middle-ground, 
with the positive and negative attributes of both personal voice and group voice interacting to create a 
unique voice effect on behavior. This additional form of voice will be tested in comparison to both 
personal voice and group voice.    
Effects of Group Voice 
The various forms voice may take can result in distinct psychological experiences. Terwel et 
al.'s (2010) notion of group voice may be unique in the sense that despite having one's interests 
championed (if merely indirectly), the psychological consequences may be similar to that of when one's 
interests are actively disregarded. In particular, group members experiencing group voice are unlikely 
to feel they have any direct control over their outcomes. Ultimately a group authority, or some form of 
representation, may be the ultimate decision-maker when a choice needs to be made within one’s group 
or among multiple groups.  The power of personal voice lies in the quality of how one is treated (e.g., 
respect) being communicated by a decision maker hearing one’s opinion on a matter.  Group voice may 
be unlikely to convey any such respect from decision makers because of the lack of opportunity to 
express opinion and/or a diffusion of relational information.  Rather than personal voice signaling that 
one is being treated fairly one-on-one (e.g., Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990), group voice signals that any 





the impact of experiencing this form of procedural justice.   
Despite the fundamental differences between personal voice and group voice, Terwel et al. 
(2010) found that group voice was preferred more than not receiving voice at all. Terwel et al. 
conducted three studies testing the effects of group voice, compared to experiencing no voice, on group 
members’ perceptions of fairness, perceived trust, and acceptance of the decision having to be made.  
Across these studies, Terwel et al. manipulated whether participants read scenarios in which a special 
interest group for participants’ beliefs (i.e., pro carbon dioxide capture and storage technology; CCS) 
and a special interest group contrary to participants’ beliefs (i.e., industrial organization against CCS) 
were either both given equal amounts of group voice or no group voice at all, or that both groups were 
given unequal amounts of group voice (i.e., for-CCS interest group gets group voice and against-CCS 
interest group does not get group voice, or vice versa) during a multi-group decision-making process 
regarding policy for the use of CCS.  
Results suggest that the more group voice one perceived, the fairer the decision-making process 
was perceived to be, the more trustworthy was the decision maker (also found to be a mediator), and 
the more acceptance one had of the decision (Terwel et al., 2010).  The findings suggest that a sense of 
group voice, compared to not having a voice, is able to predict increased levels of a particular form of 
cooperation because one trusts the decision-maker. The mediating effect of trust mirrors similar results 
consistently found in the procedural justice literatures (e.g., Colquitt, LePine, Piccolo, Zapata, & Rich, 
2012; De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; McFarlin & Sweeny, 1992; Tyler, 1989), 
suggesting that group voice may represent a special route one may take to experience procedural 
fairness.  However, a key variable that personal voice and group voice may differentially affect is one’s 
perceived level of certainty.  
Certainty 





increased chance to persuade the decision maker to come to a conclusion in the greatest interest of 
one’s self (e.g., Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974).  Outcomes may be perceived to be more 
certain if one feels capable of directing the decision being made towards one’s own benefit.  The level 
of outcome certainty (e.g., the decision outcome; personal resources) one may feel when provided with 
group voice may be relatively low because “they are not personally able to exert control” (Terwel et al., 
2010, p. 174).  With a representative reporting an opinion, the voice of the individual member is taken 
out of the equation. Terwel and colleagues recognize complete removal of one’s voice from a decision-
making process is unlikely (i.e., composite voice). However, Terwel et al. argue that the relational and 
instrumental effects of group voice are “weakened” compared to those of personal voice due to the 
implied nature of group voice processes.  Terwel et al. conclude that group voice “at best, remains a 
form of remote control for individual group members” (2010, p. 174) and involves a diminished 
guarantee that one’s personal interests may be satisfied compared to if one experiences personal voice 
(e.g., a representative negotiates the best possible outcome while still not being preferred by every 
individual member). In other words, group voice may not be able to ensure a certain level of justice 
compared to when experiencing personal voice.       
Being given a voice may serve to increase the predictability of one’s outcomes, regardless of 
whether being in favor of or against one’s own interests (Desai, Sondak, & Diekmann, 2011; Van den 
Bos & Lind, 2002).  If denied the opportunity to have voice, personal outcomes may remain highly 
uncertain and subject to the influence of others who may not have one’s best interests at heart. General 
uncertainty, or uncertainty about the nature or structure of one’s social environment or group, has been 
shown to account for fairness judgments (e.g., De Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008).  Summarizing 
Van den Bos and Lind (2002), Desai et al. (2011) argue that “fairness can increase the perceived 
predictability of future outcomes and thereby reduce uncertainty” (p. 34).  Fairness heuristic theory 





uncertainty, and uncertainty management theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002) argues that fair treatment by one’s group lessens group members’ uncertainty about group 
authorities’ behaviors (Desai et al., 2011).   Fairness has even been found to predict not only a general 
sense of being uncertain or lack of control (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001) but also uncertainty about one’s 
own mortality or one’s personal life (Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000).  Desai et al. (2011) found that 
perceived procedural justice is significantly and negatively correlated with perceived uncertainty, 
operationalized as the level of knowledge of future outcomes resulting from the decision-making 
process (e.g., “I know exactly how much salary hike I will get at my next evaluation”, “I do not know 
how much annual bonus I will receive this year”).    
In their third experiment, Desai et al. (2011) manipulated procedural justice by allowing or 
denying the opportunity for personal voice.  Participants were either given “take-it-or-leave-it” 
ultimatum (i.e., no voice) job offers or were allowed to negotiate (i.e., voice a counter-offer) with 
regards to earning points by completing mazes for one of two hypothetical companies.  Afterward, 
participants completed a series of questionnaire items prior to performance on a maze completion task.  
In the series of questions, perceived uncertainty was measured as a possible mediator of the effects of 
procedural justice, defined as the perceived fairness of situation, on performance (number of mazes 
completed).  Uncertainty in this study was operationalized as a general uncertainty of the current 
situation and predictability of the future (e.g., “I can predict what will happen next”, “How uncertain 
are you about what is happening in this situation”).  Results supported the hypothesis that the amount 
of uncertainty experienced in one’s environment is reduced when belief in the fairness of the situation 
increases.  Additionally, performance was affected in part by participants’ perceived procedural justice 
by way of the increase or decrease of uncertainty.  
Because Desai et al. (2011) manipulated being allowed to have a voice or not, their results 





output in service of a group goal) because such a fair situation positively affects how certain the 
situation was believed to be. Desai et al. tested the differential effects of procedural justice after having 
just experienced either personal voice or no voice at all (e.g., imposed).  With group voice, there may 
be a level of uncertainty at similar levels to not having any voice, given the lack of direct input on the 
part of the individual. In this sense, group voice may operate at the same level of having no voice when 
compared to being given personal voice.  
A consequence of the lack of certainty one experiences with group voice may be that positive 
attitudes and productive behaviors toward one’s group may suffer and/or occur relatively less 
frequently or at a lesser intensity; uncertainty may have a debilitating effect (Desai et al., 2011).  For 
example, performance may comparatively suffer in those experiencing group voice rather than personal 
voice because productive, cooperative group behaviors may be seen as too risky (i.e., costly to one’s 
self-outcomes) when there are low levels of perceived certainty regarding the personal consequences of 
having only the representative’s voice being heard during the decision-making process.  The 
representative’s opinion may be entirely self-serving and in no way reflect the best interest of the self 
or the group as a whole; decisions being made may be biased towards the representative’s desires and 
needs.   
In a similar fashion to fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001),  Colquitt et al. 
(2012) propose that trust serves as an uncertainty reducing mechanism, helping to explain why justice 
routinely predicts job performance.  Specifically, in a field study in a hospital system, Colquitt et al. 
found that a procedural justice factor (including items probing one's opportunities to express one's 
views and influence decisions) positively predicted one’s level of cognition-based trust (e.g., 
dependability, reliability) in one’s supervisor, reflecting similar results to those found in Terwel et al. 
(2010).  This trust was then found to negatively predict perceived uncertainty, which then negatively 





exact mechanism that drives members' perceptions of uncertainty during group voice exchanges 
compared to those that involve personal voice.  Having to work with a representative during group 
voice situations may call to mind one’s level of trust of this individual (e.g., DeCremer & Tyler, 2007; 
McFarlin & Sweeny, 1992) and how well he or she can truly represent one’s own voice.  Group voice 
may represent a low trust situation, particularly if the representative is not chosen by the members of 
the group.  Therefore, Colquitt et al.’s (2012) finding that increased trust predicts high levels of 
certainty seems to be the key relationship needed to understand why group voice may predict low 
levels of certainty.  
Certainty may have unique effects on group-directed behavior. Increased levels of perceived 
situational uncertainty may signal to individual members that their future outcomes will be limited or 
unfulfilling, regardless of one’s level of performance; high performance may not be able to overcome 
the burden of having to work in a group relegated to operating under the less-than-ideal decision that 
was made without any input other than that of the representative.  Uncertainty’s effect on behavior may 
be multifaceted, stemming from the members being unsure as to whether the decision made was as 
good as it could have been (i.e., be made more in one’s own favor).  Performance may then decrease 
during these times of lowered decision-certainty because group members may need to restrict or 
redirect their attention away from successfully performing a task to thoughts of contingency plans and 
ways to protect themselves and their already fragile and limited resources (Mayer & Gavin, 2005). 
Similarly, McAllister (1995) suggests that uncertainty in a situation creates a need to monitor one’s 
surroundings and behave defensively in order to protect oneself and one’s interests; performance 
suffers due to the stressor-like quality by which uncertainty is perceived (e.g., Sonnentag & Frese, 
2003). In other words, certainty of the outcome of the decision may predict perceived certainty of one's 
future outcomes. Whether these instances of lowered outcome-certainty may then have a powerful, 






There are additional factors that may need to be accounted for to fully understand the 
psychological impact of the various forms of voice one may experience, group voice in particular.  
Understanding the relationship between the individual member(s) and the representative may be 
crucial.  Trust in the representative or authority (e.g., DeCremer & Tyler, 2007; McFarlin & Sweeny, 
1992) and the perceived similarity among member and authority attitudes and motivations (i.e., ingroup 
bias; Hewstone et al., 2002; Smith, 1940; Stürmer & Snyder, 2010) may interact with the experience of 
group voice to predict behavior.  Furthermore, whether the representatives were selected by the 
members themselves (i.e., elected) or the representatives were chosen on behalf of members (by a 
third-party or randomly chosen) may affect individual member’s trust and perceived similarity towards 
the representative and thus positively or negatively affect behavior.  The effect of how the 
representative is chosen may further depend on one’s commitment to the group (e.g., social identity; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  It is beyond the scope of the current investigations to test these potentially 
influential factors.  However, some potential moderating factors will be tested in the current 
investigations. 
Group Size. One factor that may affect the experiences of all forms of voice involves the size of 
the group involved in the decision making process.  One must ask how many voices are being heard by 
the decision-makers. It was discussed previously the impact group size may have on one’s experience 
of voice, including but not limited to the realization that the final decision made may be less than 
satisfactory to one’s self-interests given the need to account for a multitude of varying opinions.  The 
more voices being heard during a decision-making process, the less important an individual voice may 
be (i.e., social impact theory; Latané, 1981), and the larger the group, the less likely all voices will 
ultimately be heard during group decision-making (e.g., Waller, Hope, Burrowes, Morrison, 2011).  





the belief that a decision will be made in one’s favor will be reduced with the inclusion of more “noise” 
(i.e., other voices) in the situation.   
Furthermore, one’s perceived level of certainty may differ depending upon which circumstances 
personal voice and/or group voice are experienced (e.g., varying group sizes).  If someone is a member 
of a small group and experiencing personal voice, perceptions of certainty may be relatively high 
compared to another person who is a member of a large group and is experiencing personal voice.  
Although both can be said to have experienced personal voice, the increased number of voices heard in 
the situation of the latter individual may subsequently lower his or her perception of certainty of the 
situation and/or his or her outcomes.   
The same conditional experience is expected to occur for those experiencing group voice, where 
the amount of certainty may be even less due to having to experience decisions being made solely 
through one’s representative.  A variation of group voice in which one first experiences personal voice 
(i.e., composite voice) may also lead to differing levels of perceived certainty compared to pure forms 
of either personal voice or group voice.  A group member who first experiences personal voice may 
have a sense of relatively high certainty of the situation as a whole, but when the final decision is in the 
hands of another person certainty may decrease, perhaps to levels that negate the prior experience of 
personal voice. 
Risk Aversion. As discussed previously, the level of certainty one experiences is expected to 
predict the amount or quality of group behavior. This predicted relationship between perceptions of 
certainty and performance behaviors may be moderated by one’s willingness to embrace uncertainty, or 
the extent to which one is a risk seeker or risk averse.  For example, uncertainty may stimulate 
performance for those who enjoy the experience of risk (Desai et al., 2011). Risk aversion can be 
understood as an individual difference variable representing one’s tolerance or avoidance of uncertainty 





to research on procedural justice suggesting uncertainty to be an unwanted characteristic of the 
situation (e.g., Lind, 2001; Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002), additional work has suggested that the desire for uncertainty may be variable across individuals, 
with some finding risk appealing (Maehr & Videbeck, 1968) while others find risk unappealing (Halek 
& Hisenhauer, 2001).  Further research suggests that level of risk aversion has differential effects on 
organizational behaviors (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Maehr & Videbeck, 1968).  Level of risk 
aversion has been found to interact with procedural justice (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006), with 
high risk averse individuals experiencing procedural justice increasing performance toward the 
organization while low risk averse individuals not increasing performance.  High risk averse people do 
not care for uncertainty, and Colquitt et al. argued that participants were paying attention to signals of 
fairness (e.g., having voice) because experiencing fairness could help “manage” or control one’s level 
of uncertainty (Desai et al, 2011).   
With this line of reasoning, it may be predicted that not only will risk averse individuals like 
experiencing personal voice in order to reduce uncertainty, but risk seeking individuals will dislike the 
experience of personal voice (a risk aversion x voice interaction).  This predicted effect has been 
suggested by past work.  The desire for voice has been shown to be moderated by the value one places 
on having voice (Avery & Quiñones, 2004).  A reversal of the fair process effect may occur if risk 
seekers are said to place little value on voice while the risk averse place much value on having a voice. 
This reversal of the fair process effect is precisely what Desai et al. (2011) found, whereby risk averse 
individuals actually reacted positively to not experiencing personal voice.  Furthermore, one’s level of 
risk aversion seemed to moderate the indirect effects of certainty on the relationship between voice and 
performance, supporting the argument that certainty is an important factor at various levels of risk 
aversion.   





experiencing personal voice), high and low risk averse people behave differently, with high risk averse 
individuals performing better than low risk averse individuals on a group-based task.  When certainty is 
low due to the lack of opportunity for personal voice (i.e., no voice), there was no differences found in 
performance.  Given the significant positive relationship found between personal voice and certainty, 
the lack of difference in performance found under low certainty suggests that having imposed decisions 
(i.e., no voice) does not have a strong effect on attitudes and/or behavior.  However, the question 
remains as to whether experiencing group voice, argued to also deter certainty, will exhibit the same 
pattern of results similar to when decisions are merely imposed.  The primary goal of the current 
investigations is to examine whether a different pattern of results will emerge that contrast with those 
found by Desai et al.  Group voice may provide a better “fit” for low risk averse individuals, resulting 
in an increased level of positive behaviors compared to those high in risk aversion.  
 Clearly risk aversion is a conceptually important variable to consider when studying procedural 
justice’s effect on behavior.  However, Desai et al. (2011) were limited in their testing of voice’s effect 
on behavior by relying on a manipulation of personal voice only.  The question remains as to whether 
risk aversion and its differential effect on certainty’s influence may depend on the form of voice 
experienced.  Given group voice’s inherent level of certainty (Terwel et al., 2010) compared to 
personal voice, group voice may be disliked less by risk seekers, while previous work suggests that 
personal voice may be preferred by the risk averse (e.g., Avery & Quiñones, 2004; Desai et al., 2011).  
Rather than risk seekers disliking voice’s effect of promoting certainty, risk seekers may simply dislike 
one form of voice. Therefore, one of the current investigations seeks to answer the question as to 
whether the attitudes and behavior of individuals both high and low on risk aversion may be positively 
affected by experiencing the “correct” kind of procedural justice and the resulting increase or decrease 
of certainty (i.e., conditional indirect effects, or moderated mediation; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 





level of risk aversion? 
Hypotheses 
Given the previous arguments, I formally propose three main hypotheses.  First, personal voice 
will result in increased perceptions of voice, control, and certainty.  These effects may be qualified by 
the number of voices being heard.  Voice, control, and certainty will be lowest in the group voice 
condition when there are large numbers of people involved in the decision, while voice, control, and 
certainty will be highest in the personal voice condition when there are relatively few people involved 
in the decision-making process. An additional qualifier of voice's effects may be one's level of risk 
aversion. Group members high in risk aversion given a personal voice and group members low in risk 
aversion given group voice may put forth more effort towards their groups compared to when those 
high in risk aversion are allowed group voice and low risk averse individuals are given personal voice. 
Second, the relationship between voice and behavioral outcomes will be mediated by 
perceptions of certainty.  The experience of personal voice, compared to group voice, will predict 
increased perceptions of certainty, which will in turn predict increased positive group-based effort 
and/or performance on a group-based task.  
Third, an individual’s risk aversion will moderate this mediated relationship.  High risk averse 
individuals experiencing low certainty and low risk averse individuals experiencing high certainty will 
predict relatively low levels of performance on a group-based task, while high risk averse individuals 
experiencing high certainty and low risk averse individuals experiencing low certainty will lead to 
relatively high levels of performance on a behavioral task.  Low risk averse people will respond 
negatively and have lower performance when experiencing more voice than when experiencing less 
voice via the increase of certainty, whereas high risk averse people will respond positively and have 
higher performance when experiencing more voice than when experiencing less voice via the increase 






The goal of this study was to test the relative effects different forms of voice may have on 
various process and outcome variables, including perceived trust and certainty.  Participants were given 
a brief scenario describing a situation in which they were a member of a group that needed to make a 
decision.  Across conditions, participants either experienced personal voice, group voice, composite 
voice, or a no voice control.  Furthermore, the level of impact of one’s voice (in comparison to the 
voices of other group members) was varied by manipulating the number of additional voices being 
heard.  The current study was a 4 (Voice: Personal, Composite, Group, No Voice) x 2 (Group Size: 2 
versus 20) between-participant factorial design.  
Participants 
One-hundred and sixty undergraduate students (20 participants per condition; demographic data 
was not collected) from the University of Arkansas participated in this study for course credit. 
Procedure 
Participants entered the lab and were given an informed consent form to read and complete.  
Afterward, participants were given a brief scenario adapted from De Cremer, Tyler, and den Ouden 
(2005).  The scenario included the following instructions: “Read this scenario as if you are 
experiencing the situation yourself.”  The scenario asks participants to picture themselves as an 
employee of a company that produces and sells computer games and software.  In this company, 
employees work together in teams.  At this point, the team structure was presented, and participants 
were to believe they belonged to a particular sized group, depending on condition (2-member group: 
“Your team consists of you and one other employee”; 20-member group: “Your team consists of you 
and nineteen other employees”).   
Next, it was made clear that a decision had to be made by the company regarding whether or not 





employee outcomes, it was explained that taking the game into production may be risky: if the game 
was a success, employees would get a large bonus, but if the game was a failure, there would be firings.  
The intention of adding this information was to increase one’s baseline desire to have a voice in the 
final decision. 
Finally, the voice manipulation was presented.  Depending on the type of voice experienced, 
participants read one of four descriptions of how the company’s boss wanted to use the opinions of 
employees during the decision-making process (Personal Voice: “The company’s boss asks for your 
opinion…”; Group Voice: “The company’s boss asks for your fellow employee’s opinion, to serve as a 
representative of the opinions of your entire team…You did not have a chance to discuss your opinion 
with your team’s representative”; Composite Voice: “The company’s boss asks your fellow employee’s 
opinion, to serve as a representative of the opinions of your entire team…You discussed your opinions 
with your team’s representative”; No Voice: “The company’s boss does not ask for your opinion or 
your fellow employee’s opinion during the decision-making process; the boss makes the decision 
alone”).   
Participants then completed a series of questions with the purpose of assessing the potential 
effects voice has on a variety of employee’s perceptions and expectations.  Participants were asked to 
what extent they were allowed to voice their opinion and whether they have control over the situation.  
Next, participants responded to two items adapted from McAllister’s (1995) cognition-based trust scale 
(Colquitt et al., 2012).  The two trust items are: “I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make 
the right decision” and “I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision.”  Participants’ 
responses to the two trust items were averaged to form a composite trust score (Cronbach's alpha = 
.77). 
Participants then endorsed the extent to which they would feel certain about the final outcome 





would work hard on producing the new computer game and how likely they would quit the job.  
Responses for the previous items were on a seven-point scale with higher values representing high 
agreement.  Participants were also asked the extent to which they expected either receiving the large 
bonus or being fired would occur in the future (-7 = “I will be fired”, 0 = “Unsure about what will 
happen”, +7 = “I will receive the large bonus”; recoded on a 15-point scale where low numbers 
representing certainty of failure and high numbers representing certainty of success).  The previous 
item was included as a measure of one's certainty of the consequences of the decision being made, with 
a belief in receiving the bonus or being fired reflecting certainty in receiving either positive or negative 
consequences, respectively. Once the items were completed, participants were debriefed and released 
from the session. 
Results and Discussion 
  Primary Analyses. To test Hypothesis 1, that the directness of voice one experiences 
differentially affects one's perceptions of certainty and group-based behavior depending on the size of 
the group involved in the decision-making process, multiple 4 (Voice: Personal, Composite, Group, No 
Voice) x 2 (Group Size: 2, 20) between-participant ANOVAs were run on the various dependent 
variables (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). 
For participants’ responses to whether they were allowed to voice their opinion, a significant 
main effect for Voice was found, F (3, 152) = 40.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .44. Tukey HSD indicated that the 
Personal Voice (M = 6.28) and Composite Voice (M = 6.00) conditions were not different from each 
other, while the No Voice (M = 3.78) and Group Voice (M = 2.95) conditions were not different from 
each other. Those in the No Voice control group and the Group Voice group felt they had less voice 
than those in the Composite or Personal Voice groups. All other comparisons were found to be 
significantly different. There was not a significant main effect for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .34, p > .05, 
ηp
2
 = .00, or for the Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .59, p > .05, ηp
2







     









  No Voice Group Voice Composite Voice Personal Voice 
 
Voice? 2 4.05 (2.28) 
 
3.05 (1.76) 5.80 (1.24) 6.40 (.82) 
 20 3.50 (2.24) 
 
2.85 (2.06) 6.20 (.95) 6.15 (.88) 
Control? 2 2.70 (1.26) 
 
2.90 (1.48) 3.80 (1.36) 4.35 (1.18) 
 20 1.95 (.83) 
 
2.35 (1.76) 3.70 (.86) 4.00 (1.08) 
Trust? 2 3.98 (1.46) 
 
3.73 (.97) 4.75 (1.22) 4.33 (1.35) 
 20 3.80 (1.29) 
 
3.75 (1.31) 4.28 (.91) 4.75 (.94) 
Certain 
Decision? 
2 4.20 (1.36) 
 
3.55 (1.23) 4.20 (1.20) 4.95 (1.50) 
 20 3.70 (1.53) 
 
4.00 (1.62) 4.35 (1.31) 4.95 (1.43) 
Certain 
Outcome? 
2 9.05 (1.47) 
 
8.45 (1.50) 9.25 (2.05) 9.80 (1.96) 
 20 8.70 (2.03) 
 
9.50 (2.19) 10.10 (1.94) 10.35 (2.58) 
Work hard? 2 6.25 (.91) 
 
6.05 (1.05) 6.35 (.81) 6.70 (.57) 
 20 6.50 (.61) 
 
5.95 (1.39) 6.55 (.69) 6.55 (.51) 
Quit? 2 2.20 (1.24) 
 
2.05 (1.05) 1.85 (.88) 1.65 (.88) 
 20 2.25 (1.02) 
 










 For participants’ responses to whether they had control over their situation, a significant main 
effect for Voice, F (3, 152) = 19.71, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .28, was found. Tukey HSD indicated that the No 
Voice (M = 2.33) and Group Voice (M = 2.63) conditions were not significantly different from each 
other, and the Composite Voice (M = 3.75) and Personal Voice (M = 4.18) conditions were not 
different from each other; all other pairwise comparisons were significantly different.  Participants 
either having no voice or experiencing group voice felt they had less control than participants 
experiencing either composite voice or personal voice. A significant main effect for Group Size, F 
(1,152) = 4.82, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .03, was found. Participants in the 2-person group (M = 3.44) felt they had 
more control over their situation than those in the 20-person group (M = 3.00).  Finally, there was not a 
significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .49, p >  .05, ηp
2
 = .01.    
 For participants’ trust in the company’s boss, a significant main effect for Voice was found, F 
(3,152) = 4.82, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .09.  Tukey HSD indicated that the No Voice (M = 3.89) and Group 
Voice (M = 3.74) conditions were not significantly different from each other. The No Voice condition 
was not different from the Composite Voice (M = 4.51) and Personal Voice (M = 4.54) conditions, 
which were not different from each other. Participants experiencing group voice trusted their boss less 
than participants experiencing either composite voice or personal voice. There was not a significant 
main effect for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .07, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00, or a significant Voice x Group Size 
interaction, F (3, 152) = .99, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .02.   
For participants’ certainty about the final outcome of the decision, a significant main effect for 
Voice was found, F (3,152) = 5.44, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .10. Tukey HSD indicates that the Group Voice (M 
= 3.78) and No Voice (M = 3.95) conditions were significantly different from the Personal Voice (M = 
4.95) condition. None of these was significantly different from the Composite Voice (M = 4.28) 
condition.  Participants who were given a personal voice were more certain about the outcome of the 





for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .01, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00, or a significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F 
(3, 152) = .80, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .02. 
 For participants’ certainty of the consequences of the decision, a significant main effect for 
Voice was found, F (3,152) = 3.31, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .06. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M 
= 10.08) condition was different from the No Voice (M = 8.88) condition, while not significantly 
different from Composite Voice (M = 9.68) and Group Voice (M = 8.98) conditions.  Furthermore, 
Composite Voice was not different from either Group Voice or No Voice.  Finally, Group Voice and 
No Voice were not different from each other.  Participants who were given more of a personal voice 
than others were more certain that the game would be a success and they would receive the bonus 
relative to those who did not have a voice. There was not a significant main effect for Group Size, F 
(1,152) = 2.77, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .02, or a significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .96, p > 
.05, ηp
2
 = .02. 
To assess whether experiencing more or less direct voice in differing sized groups affects  group 
members’ group-based behavior, a Voice x Group Size ANOVA on participants' expected effort in 
working hard on producing the computer game found a significant main effect for Voice, F (3,152) = 
3.72, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .07.  Tukey HSD indicate that the Group Voice (M = 6.00) condition was not 
different from either the No Voice (M = 6.38) or Composite Voice (M = 6.45) conditions. However, 
Group Voice was significantly different from the Personal Voice (M = 6.63) condition. Although the 
means for all conditions were high on the scale, participants experiencing group voice believed they 
would put forth less effort than those experiencing personal voice. All other comparisons were not 
significant. There was not a significant main effect for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .13, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00, 
or a significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .56, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .01.   
 Finally, for participants’ belief that they would quit the job, there were no significant main 
effects for either the Voice, F (3, 152) = 1.93, p > .05, ηp
2







 = .01, conditions, and the Voice x Group Size interaction was also not significant, F (3, 152) = 
.12, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00.  Neither the type of voice experienced nor the size of one’s group seemed to 
effect participants’ belief they would want to quit the job. 
The findings of the current study suggests that the group voice utilized in this study does not 
represent an opportunity to experience voice.  Group voice consistently appears to be distinct from 
personal voice.  Those who experienced personal voice reported experiencing more voice (Shapiro & 
Brett, 2005) and control (Terwel et al., 2010; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) than those with either an 
indirect voice or no voice. Those with personal voice also expressed more certainty than those 
experiencing either group voice or no voice (Desai et al., 2011; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). 
Additionally, those that experienced personal voice were able to trust more than those experiencing 
either group voice or no voice, supporting Colquitt et al.'s (2012) model and further suggesting the 
similar experience of group voice and no voice.  
The results also showed that participants believed they would put forth less effort for the group 
when experiencing group voice compared to personal voice. In other words, those experiencing group 
voice seem to be less motivated to benefit the group compared to those experiencing personal voice.  
Consistent with past work on voice (e.g., Lind et al., 1990), experiencing personal voice positively 
affects various psychological experiences and motivates positive group behaviors. However, there did 
not appear to be a difference between the projected effort for those in the Personal Voice and No Voice 
conditions. This is inconsistent with a vast literature finding an increase in effort and behavior when 
experiencing personal voice compared to no voice (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Desai et al., 
2011; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  
This similarity in expected effort between those experiencing personal voice and no voice may 
be due to the commonality of the situation used to represent the lack of voice. Specifically, participants 





input. The boss may represent a reliable, competent, and informed person to make the decision. The 
non-significant difference in participants' trust in the boss between the No Voice and Personal Voice 
conditions support this possibility. Therefore, despite the No Voice group recognizing they did not 
have a voice and believing they lacked control and certainty, trust in the boss may compensate. The 
significant difference in trust between the Personal Voice and Group Voice groups may suggest that 
having a singular representative express an opinion may bias the boss to make a poorer decision that 
does not have the entire group's interests at heart. Consequently, participants predicted they would put 
forth slightly less effort when the boss could have been corrupted by a single, biased individual. 
Unique to this study was the inclusion of a composite form of voice, where one experiences 
personal voice prior to group voice.  The results suggest that in most cases, the experience of composite 
voice is similar to that of personal voice and yet distinct from group voice: the heightened sense of 
fairness, control, and certainty that comes from personal voice is maintained after one turns over voice 
to another. This suggests that the experience of personal voice trumps that of group voice, further 
differentiating the two constructs. Taking the findings concerning the various types of voice as a whole, 
the assertions Terwel et al. (2010) made about group voice were generally supported, in that those 
experiencing group voice have less control. On the other hand, Terwel et al.'s findings that group voice 
can fulfill the relational needs of group members' above and beyond those not having a voice was not 
found, in the case of less trust in the decision-maker. A possible explanation for this may be that this 
was a survey in which participants responded to a hypothetical scenario. 
Finally, the current study failed to find any group size effects: the size of the group did not 
matter when experiencing different forms of voice.  It has been suggested that the size of a group can 
be important in affecting one’s perceived importance (Latané, 1981) and the likelihood one’s voice 
would even be heard (Waller et al., 2011).  The largest group size chosen for the current experiment 





needs was in jeopardy.  An additional follow-up investigation in which group sizes were set at 5 people 
or 50 people did find that group size interacted with the experience of voice (Schroeder, Poepsel, & 
Clay, 2013) to affect perceptions of the amount of voice one has and how fair the decision-making 
process is, with more perceived voice and higher perceptions of fairness for those with more direct 
input in the decision in small groups. Waller et al. (2011) found evidence that being a member of a 
relatively large decision-making group (i.e., 12 members) lead to lowered perceptions of conversational 
participation (not actual participation) and satisfaction compared to when group members first 
belonged to smaller subgroups before returning to the larger group. Smaller groups may simply be a 
source of perceptual efficacy rather than true decision-influence. Future work on the effects of group 
size would do well to specify the limitations on the increase in group sizes to help establish any 
relationship among the various forms of voice one may experience.   
 Correlations and Mediation. The previous results paint a consistent picture regarding the 
distinction between the experience of having more or less direct voice. To test Hypothesis 2, that 
certainty mediates the relationship between the directness of one's voice and group behavior, 
correlational analyses were run among participants' responses to the various questionnaire items and 
the experimental conditions. The primary dependent variable of interest was participants' expected 
effort given for the benefit of the group. The previous analyses indicated that more effort was expected 
to be given when experiencing personal voice compared to when experiencing group voice. Therefore, 
to understand what drives this difference in effort, only the Personal Voice and Group Voice conditions 
were used for analyses.  
 Point-biserial correlations (see Table 2) showed that having more direct voice was positively 
related to perceptions of control (r = .49, p < .001), trust (r = .33, p < .01), certainty of the outcome of 
the decision (r = .38, p < .001), and certainty of the success of the decision (r = .26, p < .05). 





Table 2 (N = 80) 
 
















1. Voice Conditions  
(PV = 1, GV = 0) 
--       
2. Voice? .75*** --      
3. Control? .49*** .73*** --     
4. Trust Boss? .33** .27* .31** --    
5. Certain Outcome? .38*** .44*** .41*** .52*** --   
6. Certain Success? .26* .24* .25* .41*** .48*** --  
7. Work Hard? .32** .20 .05 .23* .28* .32** -- 
8. Quit Job? -.21 -.19 -.09 -.23* -.18 -.13 -.53*** 














effort towards the success of the group (r = .32, p < .01). All of these findings are consistent with the 
ANOVA results. Of particular interest are the factors that are related to one's expected effort, which for 
the current purposes can serve as the primary behavioral outcome variable. The current results found 
that trust in the boss (r = .23, p < .05), certainty of the outcome of the decision (r = .28, p < .05) and 
one's certainty of success (r = .32, p < .01) were positively related to expected effort, suggesting trust 
and certainty may serve as mediators to the voice-behavior relationship. 
To explore the possible mediation of voice on expected effort by trust and certainty, a multiple 
mediation test (with mediators operating in serial; Hayes, 2012) was conducted with trust preceding 
certainty, consistent with Colquitt et al.'s (2012) model and fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van 
den Bos, 2001), and certainty directly predicting behavioral outcome, following Desai et al. (2011). 
Both forms of certainty followed trust and were entered separately as potential mediators, with the most 
relevant relationship between trust and the two forms of certainty being whether trust in the boss to 
make a good decision predicts certainty of what decision would be made, followed by a similarly 
relevant relationship existing between having participants' certainty of the outcome of the decision 
predicting the certainty of the consequences of that decision. The unstandardized regression 
coefficients for the direct effects of the relevant relationships are: Personal/Group Voice on expected 
group effort, B = .63, t (78) = 2.96, p < .01; Personal/Group Voice on trust, B = .80, t (78) = 3.10, p < 
.05; trust on certainty of decision outcome, B = .66, t (78) = 5.33, p < .001; certainty of decision on 
certainty of success, B = .67, t (78) = 4.83, p < .001; and certainty of success on expected group effort, 
B = .15, t (78) = 3.02, p < .01. To test the indirect effect of this serial-mediation, bootstrapping 
procedures (10,000 samples) revealed that the estimate of the indirect effect (M = .022, SE = .02) was 
significantly different from zero (p < .05, 95% confidence interval = .003 to .112; see Figure 1). With 
all mediators included in the model, the direct effect of voice on expected behavior remained 





























Personal Voice = 1 







(B = .63, 2.96**) 
B = .44, 2.17* 
M = .022, SE = .02 
95% CI: .003, .112 
B = .80, 3.10* 
B = .66, 5.33*** 
(B = .56, 3.49***) 
B = .67, 4.83*** 
(B = .49, 2.68**) 
B = .15, 3.02** 





influence of each variable, after accounting for previous predictors, the coefficients are: 
Personal/Group Voice on trust, B = .80, t (78) = 3.10, p < .05; trust on certainty of the decision, B = 
.56, t (77) = 3.49, p < .001; certainty of decision on certainty of success, B = .49, t (76) = 2.68, p < .01; 
and certainty of success on expected group effort, B = .10, t (75) = 1.59, p = .117. When including the 
influence of all of the variables, the certainty of success became a non-significant predictor of expected 
effort. Despite this, the amount of variance it does explain continues to contribute to the partial 
mediation found. These results should be interpreted with caution. 
Direct voice in the decision-making process predicted higher levels of trust in the boss. This 
increased trust predicted more certainty in the outcome of the decision, which in turn predicted 
increased certainty that the decision will lead to a successful outcome. Finally, the more one was 
certain that the long-term consequence of the decision was going to be a success the higher expected 
effort to be put forth in making the decision a success. Therefore, the current study supports the 
hypothesis that one of the reasons why having more voice leads to more positive group behaviors is 
because of the increased sense of trust (Terwel et al., 2010) and how trust may serve as a mechanism to 
affect one's certainty of the situation (Colquitt et al., 2012). However, the current study expands on past 
work (e.g., Desai et al., 2011) by revealing that there are different forms certainty can take, with each 
contributing an important level of explanatory power when trying to understand how the experience of 
voice affects group members' behaviors.  
Conclusions 
The purpose of Study 1 was to test any experiential differences among the various forms of 
voice.  In achieving this goal, Study 1 provides evidence that important factors in the experience of 
group voice is the different amount of certainty that is experienced compared to when group members 
experience personal voice. The purpose of Study 2 is to build on this relationship and to examine in a 





depending on the type of person experiencing the certainty.  
Study 2 
The current study adapted the procedure of Desai et al.’s (2011) Study 3.  Voice was 
manipulated between-participant (Personal, Group, and No Voice); the Composite Voice condition was 
removed because the results of  Study 1 suggest that the behavior of group members experiencing 
composite voice was primarily influenced by the allowance of personal voice (given the similarity of 
the effects of personal and composite voice).  
Participants’ level of risk aversion was measured in order to serve as a quasi-independent 
variable and potential moderator of the relationship between group members' perceived certainty and 
group behavior.  Participants’ perceived certainty was measured, and participants engaged in a timed 
brainstorming task in which behavior was objectively measured.  Participants were randomly assigned 
to receive one of three forms of negotiation to decide the payoff for the task they were to complete.  All 
participants were given an offer to work for an imaginary company brainstorming uses for an object.  If 
experiencing personal voice, participants were allowed to personally present a counter-offer in 
response to an original offer during a negotiation process.  If experiencing group voice, all participants 
were under the belief that a group representative will make a counter offer on behalf of everyone in the 
session.  If experiencing no voice, participants were not allowed to negotiate. 
Participants 
One-hundred fifty (108 female) undergraduate students from the University of Arkansas 
participated in this study for course credit and a chance in a lottery for a gift card. Two participants 
were removed from all analyses because of invalid protocol experiences, leaving the final sample size 
at 148 participants.   
Procedure 





consent form to read and complete.  They were asked to complete a questionnaire assessing risk 
aversion across various domains (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). A 36-item version of the Weber et al. 
questionnaire was utilized as a scale for risk behavior (i.e., “…indicate your likelihood of engaging in 
each activity”; 1 = “very unlikely”, 5 = “very likely”; Cronbach’s alpha = .84), with a total score 
calculated by reverse scoring all items, resulting in higher scores suggesting more risk aversion, and 
averaging these reverse scored items. Weber et al.’s risk aversion questionnaire contains six sub-scales 
regarding risk aversion in domains of ethics, investment, gambling, health/safety, recreational, and 
social, providing for a broad assessment of risk aversion. The Investment subscale was not included due 
to the low relevance the questions have for the lives of college students (e.g., “Investing 10% of your 
annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund”).  To also assess risk aversion, participants 
responded to a scenario used in Desai et al. (2011).  Desai et al. measured level of risk aversion by 
having participants hypothetically invest in a risky business proposition, with the less they invested 
indicating more risk aversion.  Participants were asked to choose the portion of an imagined $500 stake 
they wish to invest.  It was described that there was a 67% chance that the investment would fail and a 
33% chance the investment will succeed.  If the investment fails, participants would lose the amount 
invested, and if the investment succeeds, participants would receive 3.5 times the amount they invested.  
Level of risk aversion was the amount of $500 not invested (500 – Investment), with higher amounts 
suggesting a more risk averse individual. These responses were converted to a 5-point scale by dividing 
participants' responses by 100 and the converted score was combined with the Weber et al. total score. 
This composite risk aversion item was used as a risk aversion quasi-independent variable by a median-
split. 
After completing this measure, participants were read the following instructions: 
…today you are going to be working on a task that measures performance while being a 
member of a group.  The participants in this session will be a group and each of you is a 
member.   





Points are worth chances in a lottery for Best Buy gift cards at the end of the semester.  The 
more points you have, the more chances in the lottery you will receive.  Forty points equals 1 
chance. 
Each group member will separately earn points for the group.  At the end of the task, all 
group members’ earned points will be added together and divided equally back to every 
member to determine lottery chances.  In other words, every group member will receive the 
same number of chances in the lottery based on the group’s total number of earned points. 
Therefore, the number of chances in the lottery you will receive will depend not only on your 
performance but on the performance of the entire group.   
However, your performance will not always guarantee earning points; there is a 
percentage chance you will earn zero points at various points during the task. 
 
Next, participants read the following task description (adapted from Desai et al., 2011):  
 Your group has been made an offer by Smith & Co. to brainstorm uses for a common, 
everyday object.  However, their competitor, Craig & Co., would also like to make your group 
an offer for doing the same task.  These companies are interested in studying how groups affect 
creativity.  Your group can work for either Smith & Co. or for Craig & Co. 
 The researcher for this session will serve as a representative of Craig & Co. Before we 
can begin, a decision has to be made regarding how many points each generated object use will 
be worth and she will have to choose to negotiate with you in one of three ways. 
 The first way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group is 
to allow you and your fellow group members to negotiate with her directly by making counter-
offers. After you and your fellow group members are allowed to make direct counter-offers, 
Craig & Co.’s representative will take all of the offers into consideration and make a final offer.  
All group members can then accept the final offer, which means your group will brainstorm 
uses for Craig & Co. at the wage agreed to; if all group members reject the final offer, your 
group will brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them. 
 The second way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group 
is to allow a randomly chosen representative for your group to make a counter-offer on the 
other members’ behalf with no contact or input from the other members.  After the 
representative for your group is allowed to make a counter-offer, Craig & Co.’s representative 
will consider the offer and make a final offer.  Your representative can then accept the final 
offer, which means your group will brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the wage agreed to; if 
your representative rejects the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at 
the rate offered by them.   
 The third option for the Craig & Co. representative is to not negotiate with you and your 
group and to have Craig & Co.’s initial offer be the final offer. All group members can then 
accept this final offer, which means your group will brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the 
wage offered; if all group members reject the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for 
Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them. 
 Please note that in the past the going rate for this task was 50 points per generated use, 
with a 50% chance of receiving points per use.  40 points equals 1 chance in the lottery.  
 
Participants were probed with questions assessing comprehension of the description of the task 





object use generated?); incorrect responses were corrected to ensure full comprehension.   
 Participants helped the researcher brainstorm uses for a “bowl” to familiarize themselves with 
the task.  Depending on condition, the researcher led participants to believe the choice of how to 
negotiate was entirely up to the researcher (e.g., Personal Voice: “Today...I think I'm going to have all 
of you negotiate with me”; Group Voice: “Today...I think I'm going to have one of you negotiate with 
me”; No Voice: “Today...I think I'm not going to have you negotiate with me”). In this way, 
participants were aware of all possible forms of negotiation before learning which one they would be 
experiencing (as recommended by Van den Bos, 1999). Participants then presented with the company's 
offer (5 points per object use with a 25% chance of receiving points) and either presented counter-
offers directly to the researcher (Personal Voice), were told their group's representative would be 
providing a counter-offer to the researcher and were asked the current date (Group Voice), or were 
asked the current date (No Voice).  
After either having a direct voice, indirect voice, or no voice at all, participants responded to 
various questionnaire items.  Participants were asked to assess their level of voice, “I was allowed to 
voice my opinion about how many points each unique object use will be worth.” Participants also 
completed items designed to measure perceptions of procedural justice with regards to general 
assessment of fairness and the quality of treatment during the decision-making process (adapted from 
Blader & Tyler, 2003; further adapted by Desai et al., 2011).  Items include, “My views were 
considered when decisions were being made,” “The situation was handled in a fair manner,” and “How 
would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions that came up today were handled?”; 
responses were made on a seven-point scale with appropriate anchors. The items assessing perceptions 
of fairness were averaged to create an Averaged Fairness score (Cronbach's alpha = .94).  
Next, participants completed items measuring perceived control (“I feel in control of this 





outcome of the decision needed to be made, “I am certain how many points each generated object use 
is worth.”  Adapted from Desai et al. (2011), participants were also asked, “I am certain how many 
points I will earn by the end of today’s session.” Additional certainty items were adapted from 
Thompson and Parker (2007).  These items offered a more generic assessment of the level of 
uncertainty in the current environment.  Participants responded to the following items: “I feel uncertain 
about what is required of me to complete the upcoming task,” “I feel taken by surprise,” “I feel I am 
unable to function well on the task I am going to complete,” “Uncertainty will interfere with my 
performance,” and “I feel I have all the information needed to complete the upcoming task” (reverse 
scale).  Responses were measured on a seven-point scale with appropriate anchors.  These items were 
reverse coded to make higher scores represent more certainty and averaged to create a General 
Certainty score (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). 
When all participants had completed the items, the researcher then explained to participants that 
it would take some time to figure out the final offers each company would present.  Therefore, 
participants were asked to complete the brainstorming task prior to knowing the final offers; the 
researcher made participants believe that points would still be given to everyone based on the rate for 
the company that the group would ultimately choose.  By having this procedural order, any effect of 
voice and perceived uncertainty on performance behavior can remain pure.  If final offers were 
presented and accepted prior to performance, all participants (regardless of condition) would have 
shared the same level of heightened certainty, given the fact that exact point and percentage values 
would have been known; any differential effect voice might have had on certainty and performance 
may have been washed out.   
Participants were then given instructions on how to complete the task. Adapted from Harkins 
and Petty (1982), participants took part in a social loafing task in which they were asked to generate 





participants’ performance (i.e., social presentation concerns) and maximize the cooperative 
interdependence of individual participants’ behavior. In this brainstorming task, participants were told 
that they shared the responsibility for coming up with uses for the object with all members of the 
group. Participants believed their individual performance would not be measured because their uses, 
once generated, would be put into a common pool so that participants could not be associated with his 
or her creations.  
After being told the description and having any final questions answered, participants were told 
to begin working on the task. The researcher instructed that participants' task was to come up with uses 
for the object and to write only one use on a single slip of paper and to place the slip in a container 
sitting next to the participant. Participants were told to keep coming up with uses until a set amount of 
time had passed in which no one came up with a new use. Participants believed the researcher would be 
tracking this and would let them know when the task was complete. In reality, the researcher timed the 
task and gave participants 12 minutes to generate as many uses as they could and ended the task 
regardless of participants' response rate. Finally, the participants believed that when the task was done, 
they were to empty their responses into a box so that the researcher could determine the group's total. 
The researcher actually collected the containers without allowing the mixture of responses.  After the 
allotted time has passed, the task ended and participants were fully debriefed and released from the 
session.   
Results and Discussion 
Primary Analyses. To test Hypothesis 1, that the directness of voice one experiences 
differentially affects one's behavior depending on one's level of risk aversion, multiple 3 (Voice: 
Personal, Group, No Voice) x 2 (Risk Aversion: High, Low) between-participant ANOVAs were run 
on the various dependent variables (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). 
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= 158.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .69. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M = 6.29) condition was 
significantly different from the Group Voice (M = 1.54) and No Voice (M = 2.10) conditions. Group 
Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each other. Those who experienced personal 
voice reported that they had more voice than those experiencing group voice. There was also a 
significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = 3.96, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .03. Those high in risk 
aversion felt they were allowed more of a voice (M = 3.58) than those low in risk aversion (M = 3.11). 
Both main effects were qualified by a significant Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = 4.40, p 
< .05, ηp
2
 = .06. Simple effects tests indicate that in the No Voice condition, those high in risk aversion 
perceived to have been allowed significantly more voice (M = 2.82) than those low in risk aversion (M 
= 1.52), F (1,142) = 10.00, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .07. There were no significant differences in perceptions of 
voice in either the Personal Voice or Group Voice conditions dependent on one's level of risk aversion.  
For participants' belief that their views had been considered, there was a main effect for Voice, 
F (2,142) = 73.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .51. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M = 5.45) 
condition was significantly different from the Group Voice (M = 1.80) and No Voice (M = 2.27) 
conditions. Group Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each other. Those who 
experienced personal voice believed their views were considered more than those provided group voice 
or no voice at all. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .03, p > .05, 
ηp
2
 = .00. However, the Voice main effect was qualified by a significant Voice x Risk Aversion 
interaction, F (2,142) = 3.06, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .04. Simple effects tests indicate that in the Group Voice 
condition, those low in risk aversion believed their views were considered marginally more (M = 2.23) 
than those high in risk aversion (M = 1.46), F (1,142) = 2.80, p = .097, ηp
2
 = .02, while in the No Voice 
condition, those high in risk aversion believed their views were considered marginally more (M = 2.73) 
than those low in risk aversion (M = 1.89), F (1,142) = 3.33, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .02. There were no 





on level of risk aversion. 
For participants' perceptions of fairness (as measured by the Averaged Fairness score), there 
was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 45.63, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .39. Tukey HSD indicated that the 
Personal Voice (M = 5.85) condition was significantly different than the Group Voice (M = 3.10) and 
No Voice (M = 2.94) conditions. Group Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each 
other. The experience of personal voice led to increased perceptions of fairness compared to group 
voice and no voice. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .07, p > .05, 
ηp
2
 = .00, or a Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .75, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .01. 
For participants' perceptions of control, there was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 45.78, p 
< .001, ηp
2
 = .39. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M = 4.47) condition was significantly 
different from the Group Voice (M = 1.92) and No Voice (M = 2.10) conditions. The Group Voice and 
No Voice conditions were not different. The experience of personal voice leads to more perceived 
control over the situation. There was not a significant main effect of Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .69, p 
> .05, ηp
2
 = .01, or a Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = 1.79, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .03. 
Regarding participants' certainty of how many points each object use would be worth, there was 
a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 11.39, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal 
Voice (M = 3.33) and No Voice (M = 4.22) conditions were not different from each other, and the 
Group Voice (M = 2.26) condition was significantly lower than both Personal Voice and No Voice. 
Participants were less certain about the outcome of the decision being made when experiencing group 
voice compared to personal voice and no voice. Interestingly, because participants in the No Voice 
condition were not able to negotiate with the researcher, their certainty of how much each object use 
would be worth may reflect the fact that they had been given a final offer. Therefore, group voice 
appears to decrease one’s level of certainty of the outcome of the decision. There was not a significant 
main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .32, p > .05, ηp
2





Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = 1.11, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .02. 
Regarding participants' certainty of how many points they would earn by the end of the task, 
there was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 6.60, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .09. Tukey HSD indicated that the 
Personal Voice (M = 2.96) condition was significantly higher than the Group Voice (M = 1.92) and No 
Voice (M = 2.08) conditions. Group Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each other. 
Despite being certain about how many points each object use would be worth, participants in the No 
Voice condition were less certain about how many points they would ultimately earn. However, once 
again those who experienced personal voice were more certain than those experiencing group voice and 
no voice. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .33, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00, 
or a significant Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .71, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .01. 
For participants' overall sense of certainty regarding the situation (i.e., General Certainty score), 
there was not a significant main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = .73, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .01, or for Risk 
Aversion. F (1,142) = .11, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00. Furthermore, there was not a significant Voice x Risk 
Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .16, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .00. Neither one's experience of voice nor one's 
level of risk aversion affected the overall sense of certainty of one's situation. 
Finally, to test whether one's experience of voice and/or one's level of risk aversion affects 
group behavior, a 3 (Voice) x 2 (Risk Aversion) ANOVA was run on participants' total number of 
generated object uses. Results found a significant main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 3.36, p < .05, ηp
2
 = 
.05. Tukey HSD indicated that those in the Personal Voice (M = 19.27) condition generated 
significantly fewer object uses than those participants in the Group Voice (M = 24.16) condition. The 
No Voice (M = 23.06) condition was not significantly different from either the Personal Voice or 
Group Voice conditions. Participants who experienced the relatively high levels of voice put forth less 
effort than those who experienced an indirect voice. Furthermore, the same amount of effort was put 





voice or a personal voice. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .17, p 
> .05, ηp
2
 = .00, or a significant Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .65, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .01. 
The results of the current study replicated the findings of Study 1, in that having an indirect 
voice in the decision-making process is a distinctive experience compared to having a personal voice. 
As in Study 1, the current investigation found that experiencing personal voice increased one's sense of 
control and certainty compared to either having someone present a voice on your behalf or not having a 
voice. An additional feature of this study was the inclusion of a test of perceived fairness. The results 
showed that just as having personal voice leads to more control and certainty, so does it lead to 
increased perceptions of fairness. This suggests that having another person serve as a representative 
voice on one's behalf does not represent and is not perceived as a fair situation. This is in contrast to the 
conclusions made by Terwel et al. (2010). In their experiments, participants experiencing group voice 
expressed higher judgments of procedural fairness compared to when not provided a voice. This effect 
was not found in the current study, with participants in the Group Voice and No Voice conditions 
experiencing the same level of procedural fairness. The similarity between the Group Voice and No 
Voice conditions in both Study 1 and Study 2 begs the question as to whether the current 
operationalizations of group voice reflects the construct studied by Terwel and colleagues.  
An important distinction between Terwel et al.'s (2010) group voice and the form of group 
voice in the current studies may be the level of analysis at which the decision-making process occurred. 
In the Terwel et al. studies, participants believed a decision had to be made with two contrasting groups 
vying for influence over the decision-makers. Terwel et al.'s group voice is an intergroup voice. In 
Study 1 of Terwel et al., both sides of the argument were allowed a representative voice, while in the 
no voice groups, neither of the interest groups were allowed a representative voice. Consequently, 
Terwel et al.'s participants' judgments of fairness, trust, and level of cooperation were based on the 





neither of the viewpoints. Interestingly, Terwel et al.'s Study 2 found that if participants believed 
groups were provided an unequal amount of voice (i.e., only one of the two groups having a say in the 
decision), the  situation was considered significantly less fair than when both groups, even if the group 
having voice was one's own group, are provided group voice. Therefore, in order to have group 
members believe having an indirect voice is as fair of a procedure as having a direct, personal voice, 
this indirect, group voice may have to be contrasted with at least one additional indirect outgroup voice. 
In contrast, the current investigations may represent intragroup voice: one representative providing a 
single representative interest. Although an attempt was made to replicate the psychological experience 
of having one's interests indirectly presented, having a group voice during intra-group decision-making 
appears to represent a distinct situation in which group members want direct input. This distinction in 
situational context is theoretically important and warrants future work. 
However, compared to Study 1's finding that having a personal voice increases one's expected 
effort towards achieving group goals, Study 2 found that having personal voice (i.e., more procedural 
justice) led to less actual effort put forth in achieving the group’s goal. This is in contrast to the 
common finding that the more justice one experiences, the more positive group behaviors one exhibits 
(e.g., Desai et al., 2011; Terwel et al., 2010; Tyler & Blader, 2003). To probe why this unexpected 
result may be occurring, additional analyses were run. 
Correlations and Mediation. To test Hypotheses 2, that certainty mediates the relationship 
between the directness of one's voice and group behavior, correlational analyses were run among 
participants' responses to the various questionnaire items and the experimental conditions. In Study 1, 
only the Personal Voice and Group Voice conditions were selected in order to assess why there was a 
difference in expected effort found between the two groups. In Study 2, the same difference was found 
in participants' group behavior. Therefore, the remaining analyses will only include the Personal Voice 





Point-biserial correlations (see Table 4) found that having more direct voice was positively 
related to the belief that one's views were considered (r = .79, p < .001), perceptions of fairness (r = 
.70, p < .001), control (r = .68, p < .001), certainty about how many points each object use would be 
worth (i.e., decision-certainty; r = .29, p < .01), and how many points one would earn by the end of the 
day (outcome-certainty; r = .31, p < .01). Furthermore, more direct voice was negatively related to the 
number of object uses generated, or one's effort towards the success of one's group (r = -.25, p < .05). 
These findings are all consistent with the ANOVA results. Of particular interest are the factors that 
were related to one's effort. The current results found that certainty about how many points each object 
use would be worth was negatively related to effort (r = -.23, p < .05), suggesting certainty of the 
decision may serve as mediator.  
To explore the possible mediation of voice on effort by certainty of the decision outcome, a 
simple mediation test (Hayes, 2012) was conducted with certainty as the only mediator, based on Desai 
et al.'s (2011) findings. The unstandardized regression coefficients for the effects of voice on the 
number of object uses generated was obtained, B = -4.90, t (97) = -2.49, p < .05, as well as for the 
effects of voice on certainty, B = 1.07, t (97) = 2.98, p < .01, and for the effects of certainty on number 
of object uses generated, B = -1.24, t (97) = -2.32, p < .05. Following the procedures put forth by Hayes 
(2012), the bootstrapped test (10,000 samples) for the indirect effect of this mediation pattern revealed 
that the estimate of the indirect effect (M = -1.00, SE = .68) was significantly different from zero (p < 
.05, 95% confidence interval = -2.79, -.003; see Figure 2). With the mediator entered into the model, 
the direct effect of voice on object uses became non-significant, B = -3.89, t = -1.91, p > .05, 
suggesting full mediation. However, when both the voice predictor and the certainty mediator are 
entered into the model, the certainty of how many points each use would be worth becomes a 
marginally significant predictor, B = -.94, t (96) = -1.70, p = .09. Therefore, the significant mediation 


























1. Voice Conditions 
(PV = 1; GV = 0) 
 
-- 
       
2. Allowed Voice .90*** --       
3. Views Considered .79*** .84*** --      
4. Averaged Fairness .70*** .72*** .78*** --     
5. Control .68*** .73*** .85*** .76*** --    
6. Certain Points Worth .29** .30** .46*** .45*** .65*** --   
7. Certain Points Earn .31** .33*** .42*** .46*** .59*** .72*** --  
8. General Certainty .11 .12 .20 .34*** .26** .13 .22* -- 
9. Object Uses -.25* -.26** -.20 -.17 -.14 -.23* -.15 .18 








































Personal Voice = 1 
Group Voice = 0 
Object Uses 
Generated 
Certainty of Object 
Use Worth 
(B = -4.90, -2.49*) 
B = -3.89, -1.91ns 
M = -1.00, SE = .68 
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B = 1.07, 2.98** 
B = -1.24, -2.32* 





assessed by the overall role it plays in predicting how much effort would be put forth towards the 
group’s goal.  
Compared to experiencing group voice, having a more direct voice in the outcome of a decision 
predicts more certainty over the outcome of the decision, which in turn predicts less effort to be put 
forth in achieving those outcomes. This replicates the findings of Study 1 in that certainty mediates the 
voice – group behavior relationship. In the current case however, this mediated relationship contradicts 
the direction by which the mediation occurs. Rather than showing that more certainty leads to positive 
group behaviors, the current study found that those who are more certain of their future put forth less 
effort for one's group when given such an opportunity. It may be the case that for some people there is 
still a positive relationship between level of certainty and group behavior. To assess this, participants’ 
level of risk aversion was also considered in this mediated relationship. 
Moderated Mediation. To further probe the relationship between having voice and group 
behavior, a moderated mediation analysis was run to examine whether the effect of certainty of the 
decision outcome on the number of object uses generated depends on one's level of risk aversion 
(Hypothesis 3; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). It is predicted that high risk-averse individuals 
experiencing low certainty and low risk-averse individuals experiencing high certainty would generate 
fewer object uses, while high risk-averse individuals experiencing high certainty and low risk-averse 
individuals experiencing low certainty would generate more object uses.  In other words, it was 
predicted that low risk-averse people would respond negatively and have lower performance when 
experiencing more voice than when experiencing less voice via the increase of certainty, whereas high 
risk-averse people would respond positively and have higher performance when experiencing more 
voice than when experiencing less voice via the increase of certainty.   
To test this prediction, a moderated mediation analysis was run (Hayes, 2012; see Table 5). The 







 Regression Results for Moderated Mediation Analyses with Personal Voice and Group 
Voice Conditions: Study 2 (N = 99) 
 
  











Constant 1.19 .57 2.11 .037 
Voice (PV = 1, GV = 0) 1.07 .36 2.98 .004 
  











Constant 30.69 12.37 2.48 .015 
Voice  -3.85 2.08 -1.86 .067 
Certain Points Worth -1.52 3.35 -.45 .652 
Risk Aversion -.14 3.16 -.04 .964 
Risk Aversion x Certain Points Worth .15 .89 .17 .862 
  
Conditional Effects at Risk Aversion = mean and 
+/- 1 SD 
 








Bootstrap 95% CI 
(5000; Lower,Upper) 
-1 SD Risk Aversion (2.94) -1.13 .92 -3.440 .308 
Mean Risk Aversion (3.57) -1.03 .69 -2.784 .024 









model however implied that the indirect effect of voice on group behavior through certainty was not 
moderated by one's level of risk aversion. The lack of a moderated indirect effect was further evidenced 
by evaluating the bootstrapped indirect effects at multiple values of Risk Aversion. Specifically, results 
showed that all conditional indirect effects were not significant for those falling at the mean +/- 1 SD of 
Risk Aversion: -1 SD Risk Aversion = 2.94, Bootstrapped Indirect Effect = -1.13, Bootstrapped 95% 
CI: -3.440, .308; Mean Risk Aversion = 3.57, Bootstrapped Indirect Effect = -1.03, Bootstrapped 95% 
CI: -2.784, .024; + 1 SD Risk Aversion = 4.21, Bootstrapped Indirect Effect = -.92, Bootstrapped 95% 
CI: -3.099, .626.   
General Discussion 
 The purpose of the current investigations was to examine the effects of procedural justice, 
particularly the amount of voice one is given during decision-making, on positive group behaviors. In 
particular, across two studies, participants were made to believe they belonged to a group that needed 
to make a decision. In these situations, participants were provided varying degrees of voice during the 
decision-making process to see what effect this had on their perceptions of and beliefs regarding the 
situation and decision-making process, judgments of members of the group, and expectations of the 
consequences of the decision being made. The results of both studies reveal a fairly consistent picture 
of how varying degrees of voice can affect members of groups. 
 The purpose of Study 1 was to be an initial test of the relative effects various forms of voice 
during group decision-making have on group members' perceptions and predicted behaviors. 
Specifically, participants were asked to imagine themselves as belonging to a software company that 
was questioning whether to take a new computer game into production. As a member of one of two 
work groups of different sizes (i.e., 2 people versus 20 people) within the larger software company, 
participants were given one of four scenarios depicting the boss of the company requesting the opinions 





the boss (Personal Voice), every member of the group provide their opinion to a group representative 
who then provides an opinion to the boss (Composite Voice), a single group representative provides an 
opinion to the boss on behalf of the entire group with no group member input (Group Voice), or no 
group members were allowed to voice their opinions and the boss would decide alone (No Voice).  
 The results of Study 1 found that having a personal, direct voice, whether it directed at the 
authority or one's representative, is related to increased perceptions of control, trust, and certainty and 
is related to more predicted effort put forth for the group. In contrast, having either only an indirect 
voice or no voice at all was shown to be related to low levels of control, trust, and certainty. 
Furthermore, simply having an indirect voice was related to less predicted effort given toward 
achieving group goals.  The findings of Study 1 suggest that the reason more voice is related to more 
positive group effort is because of how trust in the decision-maker is positively related to being more 
certain of what that decision-maker will do, which in turn predicts more certainty of how the decision 
will affect one’s self as a member of the group in the future. Therefore, Study 1 supports the notion that 
the psychological experiences of group voice and personal voice are quite divergent. 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to bring the current research questions into the lab and see whether 
similar results could be found when participants belonged to a real group. Participants joined four other 
group members with the task of generating uses for an everyday object so the group could earn points 
for chances in a lottery. How many points each object use was worth, though, was dependent on how 
the researcher chose to negotiate (i.e., provide an opportunity for voice) with the group. Depending on 
condition, participants believed every member of the group would provide a counter-offer to the 
researcher's initial offer (Personal Voice), a randomly chosen group representative would provide a 
counter-offer on behalf of the rest of the group without any input from the other group members 
(Group Voice), or the group was not allowed to negotiate (No Voice).  





increased perceptions of voice and certainty. Trust in the decision-maker was not measured in Study 2 
because it was unclear whether there was a single, distinct decision-maker. In the cover story for Study 
2, participants believed that after negotiations, the group would ultimately be provided two offers from 
two fictional companies that wanted the group to create object uses at a particular rate. In this sense, 
participants were led to believe that the group itself would have the final say as to whom they would 
work for and for how many points. Compared to the scenario in Study 1, where the boss clearly 
represented the decision-maker, the paradigm used in Study 2 was not conducive for establishing a 
single authority that needed to be trusted. It could be argued that the researcher, who was or was not 
going to use the group's voice(s), could be a worthy target for group members' trust. However, it was 
believed to be an unrealistic situation in which the authority could not be trusted. In other words, 
having participants evaluate a researcher seemed likely to only show ceiling effects in perceptions of 
trust. Obviously this may not be the case and future work would do well to measure group members' 
trust in the researcher, believing that just as found in Study 1, trust would be higher when provided a 
personal voice compared to a group voice or no voice.  
Voice’s Different Effect on Behavior 
 An unexpected finding in Study 2 was that more voice given to group members was related to 
fewer object uses generated on behalf of the group. Inconsistent with the conclusions drawn from Study 
1, participants in Study 2 put forth less effort on the task at hand after having been given a direct say as 
to how the task should benefit the group. In a task that measures the motivation of individual members 
to benefit the group as a whole, having a personal voice appears to lessen this motivation so that 
members appear to be less cooperative than when members are merely provided a group voice. Allison, 
Messick, and Samuelson (1985) found similar results in their field study of public-good contributions. 
Allison et al. contacted the alumni of a graduate psychology program saying that the quality of 





alumni were asked for monetary donations to help sustain the high quality of the public good. The 
independent variable was whether the alumni were simply asked to donate money or whether they were 
asked for money and their opinions were solicited regarding how the department should use the money 
that is collected. The later condition represented an opportunity for the alumni to provide a voice, with 
Allison et al. predicting that those alumni that had their opinions solicited would contribute more. 
 Despite the fact that there were no differences in the overall number of alumni that chose to 
contribute money between those who had their opinions solicited or not, it was found that those who 
were given a questionnaire about their opinions contributed significantly less than those who did not 
have their opinions asked. Allison et al.'s (1985) post hoc explanation for this unexpected result 
suggests that the level of contribution represents a form of helping response and that the alumni were 
induced to weigh the costs and benefits of making that helping response. The authors discuss that the 
alumni's “cost” of filling out the questionnaire (i.e., effort exerted; time lost) may have affected the 
alumni's contribution behavior. As Allison et al. (1985) put it: “returning the questionnaire may have 
been counted as a contribution to the department that had some significant cash equivalence” (p. 204). 
In this sense, those who are given a voice during decision making may “overestimate the impact of 
their actions” (p. 205); similar results have been found related to an egocentric bias regarding 
attributions of responsibility for the outcome of a joint product (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Although this 
explanation is speculative, the current results show the same pattern of results. Participants in the 
Group Voice and No Voice conditions did not technically provide a voice and thus may not have 
provided a significant contribution to attaining the goal of a final decision. This explanation for Study 
2's findings remains consistent with the findings of Study 1 because in Study 1 participants were 
merely asked to report their level of expected effort. Having a direct voice may positively affect group 
members' expectations while adversely affecting actual group behavior through a diffusion of 





such as commitment to one's group and the perceived efficacy of one's voice in the final decision-
outcome.  
 To say that group members who experienced personal voice are unmotivated may be unfair. 
The truth may be that being given a personal voice changes one’s motivation to be more ego-centric 
and away from an orientation to help the group. Rather than being unmotivated because of diffusion of 
responsibility, group members that provide a personal voice may be actively trying to avoid being the 
“sucker” of the group and being taken advantage of by the other members. This suggests that if all 
members are trying to avoid being the sucker, then the group's overall output would be less than it 
would be if all were putting forth full effort. Those given a personal voice may believe that the 
outcome of the decision will be optimal: the highest number of points per object use, relative to the 
initial offer, that this group could negotiate. This means the final decision would likely result in the 
highest amount of points earned. This belief may make those who provided a personal voice realize 
that the other members of the group want to receive these points without having to earn them. 
Therefore, having a personal voice may make group members self-protective and defensive.  
Another possible outcome of holding a belief that personal voice means the final decision will be ideal 
is that it makes the situation quite lucrative for one's self and thus a perfect opportunity to loaf. Being 
given opportunities for voice have been shown to raise recipients' outcome expectancies (Houlden, 
Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Rather than making oneself overly defensive, 
having a personal voice may actively promote more selfish patterns of behavior. Consequently, if not 
provided a voice or merely provided group voice, then one must put in significantly more effort to 
compensate for the less-than-ideal decision made. The results of Study 2 support these potential lines of 
thinking, with those in the Group Voice condition putting forth the most effort, perhaps because having 
a single representative provide a voice leaves open the possibility that the representative’s voice was 





 On the other hand, another possible explanation for Study 2’s findings may be that when given 
a personal voice one believes that the outcome of the decision will be sub-optimal or averaged across 
the many voices; giving all group members a voice may force the decision-maker to settle to 
accommodate everyone’s opinion. Therefore, group members may feel that some internal goal of 
earning a particular number of lottery chances may be more difficult to achieve because of the less-
than-ideal compromise that had to be made. In this sense, those given a personal voice may not feel 
their efforts are worth it and are content in working less. Consequently, this would suggest that those 
provided group voice expect the final decision to be optimal and worth the time and effort needed to 
successfully complete the task. Zaccaro (1984) found that social loafing decreases under conditions of 
high task attractiveness,  with task attractiveness manipulated by having participants believe the highest 
scoring group in the social loafing task would receive extra experimental credits (high attractiveness) or 
not including any information about extra experimental credits (low attractiveness).   
It has been argued that commitment to the group and/or commitment to the successful 
completion of social loafing tasks are factors that exert a force on group members to reduce loafing and 
promote positive group behaviors (Festinger, 1950). To ensure commitment, groups can increase how 
much group output is worth for each individual member. In other words, a task may be said to be 
attractive and worth doing if the outcomes of the task are substantial and profitable for the group's 
members. The question remains as to whether having group voice fulfills these criteria? This is 
unlikely, given the similarity in the number of generated object uses between the Group Voice and No 
Voice conditions. The only information provided to participants in the No Voice condition was that the 
company representative's offer was extremely low (5 points with a 25% chance) compared to the 
historical information provided (40 points with a 50% chance). It is unlikely that the No Voice groups 
felt this was optimal. Future work would do well to question group members' beliefs about the expected 





worth reflects whether one was given a direct voice or an indirect voice. 
Why Voice Affects Behavior 
 In both studies, mediational analyses found that participants' perceptions of certainty help 
explain why experiencing voice predicts future behavior. In Study 1, having more direct voice 
predicted more trust in the boss to make the correct decision, which in turn predicted more certainty of 
the outcome of the decision. Certainty of what the decision would be predicted more certainty that the 
consequences of the decision would be a success, which ultimately predicted more projected effort 
given toward accomplishing group goals. The findings of Study 2 found that having more direct voice 
predicted more certainty of the outcome of the decision, which in turn predicted fewer object uses 
generated. The reason why perceptions of certainty played such an important role in determining group 
members' behavior may be because group members, in both studies, had to make judgments about the 
decision without having any information about the outcome of the decision. Group members had to rely 
on internal judgments and perceptions to guide their behavior because the external situation lacked 
evidence that could help inform their decisions to behave a particular way. The hypothetical nature of 
Study 1 required that participants project how much effort they would be willing to put forth towards 
the company's goal, with no real decision ever being made. In Study 2, participants had been told time 
was running short and that it would be best if the group would complete the object-use task prior to 
learning how many points each object use would be worth. In both cases, judging the quality of the 
decision-making process (e.g., what does having group voice mean for the success of me and my 
group?) could not rely on the outcome of the decision. 
 Baron and Hershey (1988) investigated outcome biases when evaluating decisions. Evaluations 
are often made after the fact, which suggests that knowing the outcome of a decision may bias one's 
evaluations of the quality of the decision. It may be difficult to differentiate between a good decision 





made should be “irrelevant to the quality of the decision” (Baron & Hershey, 1988, p. 569). Therefore, 
group members who are provided with a particular amount of voice during group decision-making and 
are subsequently asked to behave prior to knowing the decision outcome may not succumb to this 
outcome bias. Baron and Hershey's had participants read about various decisions having to be made 
and the outcomes of those decisions. For example, one scenario depicted a 55-year-old man, with a 
heart condition having to stop work and quit recreational activities. Participants further read that a 
bypass operation could help his pain but that the operation had a high success rate. Finally, the 
participants were told that the man's physician decided to do the operation and it was a success. After 
reading a scenario such as the one depicted above, participants were asked to evaluate the physician's 
decision to do the operation. Variations of the scenarios reflected different decisions having to be made 
and different outcomes (e.g., the operation failed and the man died). The results generally found that 
participants rated the decision-making thinking as better, judged the decision maker as more 
competent, and were more willing to yield to the decision when the outcome was favorable compared 
to unfavorable. A reason why outcome information biases one's evaluations of a decision is that beliefs 
about the probability of an outcome are modified after gaining outcome information. Knowing that an 
outcome occurred makes you believe that outcome was more probable, or more certain to have 
occurred (hindsight bias). 
 The participants in Study 1 and Study 2 did not have decision-outcome information, so they 
could not use this information to judge the quality of the voice procedure. However, being able to 
directly express an opinion about whether a game should go into production or about how many points 
each object use should be worth may make one believe there is outcome information. In one sense, by 
providing a direct voice, group members are creating their own outcome information (similar to the 
notion of voice providing “outcome control”; Shapiro & Brett, 2005), despite the real possibility it is 





then argue that the current participants could still succumb to the outcome bias and evaluate the quality 
of the decision and decision-making process, subsequently guiding decisions to behave a particular way 
towards the group, by reflecting on self-generated outcome information. This self-generated 
information may further modify the judged probability of an outcome, helping to explain why 
perceived certainty (increased probability of an outcome) results from experiencing more direct forms 
of voice and why this certainty helped predict future behavior.  Across both studies, it appeared that the 
judged probability of the decision outcome increased with more voices involved (Desai et al., 2011; 
Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).  
Group Voice versus No Voice   
 Finally, the current studies suggest that the experience of group voice may be similar to that of 
not having a voice at all, evidenced by the consistent lack of differences between those in the Group 
Voice and No Voice conditions across both studies. The lack of differences is in contrast to Terwel et 
al.'s (2010) findings that the experience of group voice is distinct from not having a voice when 
evaluating one's level of trust of the decision makers (group voice leading to more trust) and when 
deciding whether to accept the final decision made (i.e., cooperation; group voice leading to more 
acceptance/cooperation).  
 This inconsistency may be explained by Terwel et al.'s (2010) operationalization of group voice 
as when an interest group (i.e., an association of like-minded people that publicly promotes and creates 
advantages for its cause) receives an opportunity to voice group members' opinions during decision-
making. In their studies, Terwel et al.'s participants were induced to be pro carbon-dioxide capture and 
storage (CCS; i.e., on the side of a pro-CCS, environmental non-governmental organization), and were 
led to believe that pro- or con-CCS interest groups were either allowed or denied the ability to advise a 
national government “CCS board.” The presence or absence of participants' group voice came in the 





the participants’ now held beliefs.  The difference between the current findings and Terwel et al.'s may 
be due to the fact that the current participants believed they would have a single representative express 
their opinions rather than having an entire interest group, of multiple voices, being represented. It may 
be easier to trust the efforts of a group of representatives rather than the efforts of a single person. 
Therefore, the current investigation's operationalization of group voice may naturally lead to lowered 
levels of trust compared to other forms group voice can take. The possibility that the number of voices 
representing one's voice can serve as a moderator of the psychological effects of group voice has great 
potential for future investigations.   
Future Directions 
 Based on the analysis of the two studies above, there are many possibilities for future avenues 
of research. First, replications of the current studies would benefit from asking group members 
precisely of what they feel certain. The results of both Study 1 and 2 suggest that the reason why 
having voice during decision making affects group behavior is because voice affects perceptions of 
certainty. However, participants in the current studies were asked to respond to items assessing 
certainty targeted at the situation (e.g., “I am certain how many points each generated object use is 
worth”). Responses to this item, for example, cannot tell us precisely how many points they believed 
each use would be worth. Participants who experienced high amounts of certainty in Study 2 may have 
been certain that each use would be worth 80 points, either making one's individual contributions more 
lucrative or representing a perfect situation in which to slack off and loaf. It may also be the case that 
participants were very certain that each use would only be worth 8 points, either making one's 
contributions that more crucial to help the group succeed or representing a situation that behaving is not 
worth the effort. To begin to understand how high levels of certainty can in one instance predict more 
effort while in another instance predict less effort, it will be important to further probe group members 





group or will be detrimental to oneself/the group (e.g., “How many points do you think each object use 
will ultimately be worth?”; “Do you believe this point value will be beneficial for you/for the group?”). 
Responses to these items can help us gain insight into group members' motivational state, which may 
further help predict in what direction behavior will occur. 
 The fact that group members across both studies may have been in differing motivational states, 
despite explicitly expressing a state of certainty/uncertainty, suggests that another avenue of future 
research may focus on varying the type of task in which various forms of voice may be given. In Study 
1, participants took on the role of a group member in a larger company, with participants believing they 
had at least one boss. The task in Study 2 was purposefully chosen to be a social loafing task, in which 
individual input could not be traced back to a single group member. Therefore, Study 1 may have 
represented a scenario that lacked anonymity (however this is speculation given the scenario-based 
nature of the task), while Study 2 represented a high-anonymity task. 
 Desai et al.'s (2011) Study 3 had participants complete mazes for one of two imagined 
companies. Similar to the current Study 2, Desai et al. had participants use a keyboard to move a blue 
dot through a maze to reach an end-point, and for each maze completed, an individual would earn 
points based on how he/she had been allowed to negotiate with one of the company's representative. 
Desai et al. found that having personal voice predicted higher perceptions of certainty, which in turn 
predicted more mazes completed. This contradicts the current Study 2's findings. However, Desai et al. 
measured participants individually, not as members of a group. It is very likely that Desai et al.'s 
participants did not feel anonymous completing their task on a computer, where the researcher was 
tracking individual performance. Having a more direct voice negatively predicted performance in the 
high-anonymity, social-loafing task in Study 2, suggesting that having a more direct voice may make 
one certain that each object use will be worth enough points to legitimately free-ride on the effort of 





non-social loafing group tasks to see if the pattern of results reflect those found in Study 1 and Desai et 
al. (2011), where having a more direct voice and more certainty both positively predicted behavior.  
 Another interesting future question deals with the level of analysis in which group voice is 
experienced. As discussed previously, the current form of group voice most readily represents 
intragroup voice, where a single representative is speaking on behalf of other members of the same 
group. Terwel et al.’s (2010) intergroup voice occurs when two (or more) groups each send a 
representative to express differing opinions. It is clear that future work on group voice should focus on 
clarifying why under particular conditions having one’s voice indirectly expressed either positively or 
negatively affects group members. Particularly at the intergroup level, the positive effects of group 
voice may be contingent on other psychological processes, such as ingroup favoritism (i.e., the ingroup 
bias effect; Brewer, 2007; Hewstone et al., 2002; Scheepers et al., 2006) or high levels of intergroup 
competition and low levels of trust in the outgroup (i.e., the individual-group discontinuity effect; Insko 
et al., 1998; Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001; Lodewijkx, Rabbie, & Visser, 2006; Schopler et al., 
1994).  Under such circumstances, having an indirect voice is at least better than not having a voice at 
all, just as long as the outgroup cannot have an abundance of unchecked influence; group voice is better 
than their voice. 
During intragroup voice, however, another factor that future work can focus on may be how the 
representative for the group is chosen. In Study 1, the participants read that the boss chose the 
representative, and in Study 2 it was made clear the representative was to be chosen at random. 
Whether one identifies with the representative as a fellow group member (i.e., social identity theory; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) may affect the level of trust in the representative to truly speak on behalf of the 
entire group, including oneself. If group members are given the opportunity to choose their 
representative voice (e.g., by unanimous vote or simple majority) then the representative may be 





which intragroup voice can positively affect individual group members’ motivations and behaviors. 
This may explain why Terwel et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between being provided group 
voice and trust, because the participants and the interest groups were explicitly made to believe they 
share the same values and goals and are consequently alike within the same social category. 
 Finally, a future extension of the current studies would be to examine whether group members' 
social value orientations help predict the desire for personal voice or group voice. Social value 
orientation (SVO) is an individual difference variable that differentiates between egocentric and 
egalitarian motives during group decision-making (e.g., Messick & McClintock, 1968). Individuals that 
hold egocentric and egalitarian perspectives are common labeled as proselfs and prosocials, 
respectively. Regarding the distinction between personal voice and group voice, proselfs and prosocials 
appear to desire different distributions of voice among group members. Van Prooijen et al. (2008) 
found that proselfs are consistently “responsive to variations in the extent to which decision-making 
authorities allow or deny them the opportunity to voice their opinions” (Van Prooijen, Ståhl, Eek, & 
Van Lange, 2012, p. 1248). Van Prooijen et al. (2012) show that when someone else receives a voice, 
one's own procedure is viewed more favorably after receiving a voice compared to when denied a 
voice. However, SVO did not appear to matter following an own no-voice procedure when another 
received voice. When the self is denied an opportunity to have a voice, and someone else is given that 
opportunity instead, perceptions of the fairness are expected to be low. This replicates the findings of 
the current studies, with participants from both studies in the Group Voice conditions believing such a 
system with some random person being given a voice, ostensibly as a representative voice for the 
group, to be unfair.   
 What is interesting in Van Prooijen et al.'s (2012) findings is that when another person is denied 
a voice, SVO appeared to affect perceptions of one's own procedure. Van Prooijen et al.'s results found 





voice. Proselfs perceived procedures to be fair only if they received voice, regardless of whether 
anyone else received voice. Prosocials were concerned about whether there was an equality of voice 
between people, whether this means both received a voice or both were denied a voice. With this in 
mind, it may be the case that SVO differentially matters in procedural judgments depending on the 
form group voice takes. If during intergroup decision-making both groups' members experience group 
voice (i.e., both groups send a representative voice), then both proselfs and prosocials may be happy 
and experience fairness either because the self receives a voice or because there is an equality of voice 
among groups. Although not measured, this may account for the increased perceptions of fairness with 
Terwel et al.'s (2010) intergroup voice. Unfortunately, during intragroup voice, the fact that a 
representative's voice is the only voice being heard is quite salient in the mind of group members, thus 
predicting that perceptions of group voice to be universally unfair for all SVO types (either because the 
self is denied a voice or because there is an inequality of voices within the group). Taken together, 
these findings suggest measuring group member's SVOs may help further the literature on group voice 
by differentiating when and why people may believe it is acceptable to experience group voice. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the findings of the current research suggest that groups must take care to ensure 
their members are treated in a fair manner because there are both benefits and limitations to providing 
members a voice during decision-making. Particularly relevant for a wide variety of real-world groups, 
the results of the above studies suggest that it would be wrong to rely solely on group voice to instill a 
sense of procedural justice in the minds of the members of the groups. However, the need for group 
voice is quite common in an ever-more-complex society. For example, there can be various 
opportunities for voices to be heard within a large corporation, such as having a small group of 
employees airing grievances to a manager or a union representative sitting in on negotiations for 





with one’s personal voice being sent continually up the line in an ever more indirect fashion.  
Unfortunately, the current research argues that such a group structure may provide efficiency at 
the cost of individual member satisfaction. Interestingly, there are other cases of group voice that occur 
in the real world where group members have historically been satisfied with having one’s interests 
represented with no day-to-day, direct input to the point that large amounts of personal time and money 
are given to ensure this indirect voice can be heard (e.g., Congress). However, as Terwel et al. (2010) 
found, the positive effects that come from this form of group voice may rest on the fact that it is 
intergroup voice, where one’s indirect voice is at least better than another’s voice alone. Taking Terwel 
et al.’s findings and the current findings together, the endeavor to understand group voice will be 
complex and beneficial. The future of research on the effects of group voice is full of possibilities and 
will be conducive to interdisciplinary investigations that are relevant not only to the psychological 
literature but also to the understanding of society’s fundamental notions of what is considered 
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Appendix A: Study 1 Informed Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
Title: Evaluating Employee Decision-Making  
 
Investigator(s):  
David A. Schroeder, Ph.D 
Dennis L. Poepsel, M.S. 
University of Arkansas 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
216 Memorial Hall 
Fayetteville, AR 72703 
479-575-4256 
Administrator: 
Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator 
Research & Sponsored Programs 
Research Compliance 
University of Arkansas  
210 Administration 




Restrictions: You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this experiment. 
 
Description:  As a participant, you will be presented with a scenario asking you to take on the role of an employee of a 
company and you will be asked to answer a series of questions based on the situation depicted in the scenario.  This study 
will take 30 minutes.  
 
Confidentiality: The responses you provide on materials associated with this experiment will be recorded anonymously, 
separate from this consent form, and kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Your name will 
never be used in reporting the results of our research. 
 
Risks and Benefits: There are no risks to participating in the study.  By participating in this study, the researchers will have 
a clearer picture as to how group members desire interactions to occur within a group. Participants will also gain insights 
into how psychological research is actually conducted.  Participants will receive research participation credit for this study 
(1/2 research credit). 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary.  You are free to discontinue your 
participation in this study at any time. You do not need to answer any question that you do not want to answer.  You may 
receive credit toward your General Psychology research requirement for participation. If you discontinue participation, you 
will still receive credit commensurate with the time you have spent.  
 
Informed Consent:  I have read the description, including the nature and purpose of the study, the procedures to be used, 
the potential risks and benefits, as well as the option to discontinue my participation in the study at any time.  I believe that I 
understand what I will be doing.  By typing my name below, I indicate that I am over 18 years of age and freely agree to 
participate in this experimental study. 
 
____________________________________  










Appendix B: Study 1 Scenarios and Questions 
 
*2 Person Group/Personal Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a 
new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus, 
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks for your opinion and your fellow employee’s 
opinion in order to use them during the decision-making process. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 






*20 Person Group/Personal Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to 
take a new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large 
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks for your opinion and all of your fellow 
employees’ opinions in order to use them during the decision-making process. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 





*2 Person Group/Group Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a 
new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus, 
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks for your fellow employee’s opinion, to serve as a 
representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process.  You do not have a 
chance to discuss your opinion with your team’s representative before he talks to the boss. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 





*20 Person Group/Group Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to 
take a new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large 
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks one of your fellow employee’s opinion, to 
serve as a representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process.  You and 
the other team members do not have a chance to discuss your opinions with your team’s representative before he talks to the 
boss. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 





*2 Person Group/Composite Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a 
new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus, 
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks your fellow employee’s opinion, to serve as a 
representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process.  You discuss your 
opinions with your team’s representative before he talks to the boss. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 










*20 Person Group/Composite Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to 
take a new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large 
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks one of your fellow employee’s opinion, to 
serve as a representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process.  You and 
the other team members discuss your opinions with your team’s representative before he talks to the boss. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 





*2 Person Group/No Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a 
new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus, 
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss does not ask for your opinion or your fellow 
employee’s opinion during the decision-making process; the boss makes the decision alone. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 





*20 Person Group/No Voice 
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself. 
 
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software.  In this company, employees work 
together in teams.  Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to 
take a new computer game into production.  Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large 
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss does not ask for your opinion or all of your 
fellow employees’ opinions during the decision-making process; the boss makes the decision alone. 
 
I am allowed to voice my opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I have control over this situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Very Much 
So 
 
I expect the following to occur in the future. 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
I will be 
fired 




      I will receive 
the large bonus 
 
I will work hard on producing the new computer game. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I will most likely quit this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All      Definitely 
 






Appendix C: Study 2 Informed Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
Title: Group Influence on Creativity  
 
Investigator(s):  
David A. Schroeder, Ph.D 
Dennis L. Poepsel, M.S. 
University of Arkansas 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
216 Memorial Hall 
Fayetteville, AR 72703 
479-575-4256 
Administrator: 
Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator 
Research & Sponsored Programs 
Research Compliance 
University of Arkansas  
210 Administration 




Restrictions: You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this experiment. 
 
Description:  As a participant, you will join a group and work on tasks to measure creativity while under group influence.  
You will also complete a series of questionnaire items about yourself and your experiences in the experiment.  This study 
will take 1 hour.   
 
Confidentiality: The responses you provide on materials associated with this experiment will be recorded anonymously, 
separate from this consent form, and kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Your name will 
never be used in reporting the results of our research. 
 
Risks and Benefits: There are no risks to participating in the study.  By participating in this study, the researchers will have 
a clearer picture as to how group member performance is affected by group processes. Participants will also gain insights 
into how psychological research is actually conducted.  Participants will receive research participation credit for this study 
(1 research credit). 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary.  You are free to discontinue your 
participation in this study at any time. You do not need to answer any question that you do not want to answer.  You may 
receive credit toward your General Psychology research requirement for participation. If you discontinue participation, you 
will still receive credit commensurate with the time you have spent.  
 
Informed Consent:  I have read the description, including the nature and purpose of the study, the procedures to be used, 
the potential risks and benefits, as well as the option to discontinue my participation in the study at any time.  I believe that I 
understand what I will be doing.  By typing my name below, I indicate that I am over 18 years of age and freely agree to 
participate in this experimental study. 
 
____________________________________  










Appendix D: Study 2 Demographic/Risk Aversion Questionnaire 
 
Please complete the following items.  There are no right or wrong answers. 
Gender:    Male    Female 
 
Age:  _____________________ 
 
Class:   Freshman    Sophomore    Junior    Senior 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or behavior.   
 
1. Admitting that your likes and dislikes are different from those of your friends. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
2. Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
4. Buying an illegal drug for your own use. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
5. Cheating on an exam. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
6. Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
7. Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
8. Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
9. Disagreeing with a parent on a major issue. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
10. Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
11. Having an affair with a married man or woman.  
1 2 3 4 5 








12. Forging somebody’s signature.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
13. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
14. Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and hotel accommodations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
15. Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different opinion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
16. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
17. Approaching your boss to ask for a raise.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
18. Illegally copying a piece of software. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
19. Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
20. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g., baseball, soccer, or football). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
21. Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
22. Shoplifting a small item (e.g., a lipstick or a pen). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
23. Wearing provocative or unconventional clothes on occasion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
24. Engaging in unprotected sex. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
25. Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for. 
1 2 3 4 5 







26. Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
27. Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky diving). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
28. Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
29. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
30. Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
31. Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
32. Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
33. Trying out bungee jumping at least once. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
34. Piloting your own small plane, if you could. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
35. Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
36. Regularly eating high cholesterol foods. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not sure Likely Very Likely 
 
 
Read the following scenario and answer the question below: 
 
You have recently earned $500.  A friend of yours has asked you to invest money into a risky investment.  There is a 67% 
chance that the investment will fail and a 33% chance the investment will succeed.  If the investment fails, you will lose the 
amount of money that you invest.  If the investment succeeds, you will receive 3.5 times the amount that you invest.  What 
amount of money would you be willing to invest in this risky investment? 
 









Appendix E: Study 2 Task Description 
Your group has been made an offer by Smith & Co. to brainstorm uses for a common, everyday object.  However, their 
competitor, Craig & Co., would also like to make your group an offer for doing the same task.  These companies are 
interested in studying how groups affect creativity.  Your group can work for either Smith & Co. or for Craig & Co. 
 
The researcher for this session will serve as a representative of Craig & Co. Before we can begin, a decision has to be made 
regarding how many points each generated object use will be worth and she will have to choose to negotiate with you in one 
of three ways. 
 
The first way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group is to allow you and your fellow group 
members to negotiate with her directly by making counter-offers. After you and your fellow group members are allowed to 
make direct counter-offers, Craig & Co.’s representative will take all of the offers into consideration and make a final offer.  
All group members can then accept the final offer, which means your group will brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the 
wage agreed to; if all group members reject the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at the rate 
offered by them. 
 
The second way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group is to allow a randomly chosen 
representative for your group to make a counter-offer on the other members’ behalf with no contact or input from the other 
members.  After the representative for your group is allowed to make a counter-offer, Craig & Co.’s representative will 
consider the offer and make a final offer.  Your representative can then accept the final offer, which means your group will 
brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the wage agreed to; if your representative rejects the final offer, your group will 
brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them.   
 
The third option for the Craig & Co. representative is to not negotiate with you and your group and to have Craig & Co.’s 
initial offer be the final offer. All group members can then accept this final offer, which means your group will brainstorm 
uses for Craig & Co. at the wage offered; if all group members reject the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for 
Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them. 
 
Please note that in the past the going rate for this task was 50 points per generated use, with a 50% chance of receiving 

















Appendix F: Study 2 Process Questionnaire 
 
Please complete this short questionnaire. 
 
I was allowed to voice my opinion about how many points each unique object use will be worth. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
My views were considered when decisions were being made. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
The situation was handled in a fair manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
How would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions that came up today were handled? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Fair at 
All 
     Very Fair 
 
I feel in control of this situation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I am certain how many points each generated object use will be worth. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I am certain how many points I will earn by the end of today’s session. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel uncertain about what is required of me to complete the upcoming task. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Completely 
 
I feel taken by surprise. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Completely 
 
I feel I am unable to function well on the task I am going to complete. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 









Uncertainty will interfere with my performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
I feel I have all the information needed to complete the upcoming task. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 






















































Appendix G: Study 2 Script (Personal Voice/Group Voice/No Voice) 
 
Hello, my name is ________.  I am the researcher for this experiment. The first thing we need you to do is complete an 
Informed Consent form.  Please read it over and sign it if you agree to participate.  I will collect them when everyone is 
done. 
 Pass out INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Collect INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Today you are going to take part in a study on human creativity within a group context.  Specifically, how being a member 
of a group affects your behavior.  To begin, I would like to have you all fill out a demographic questionnaire.  I will collect 
them when everyone is done.  The number attached to the questionnaire is your personal ID number.  Please remove the 
number from the questionnaire and put it into the plastic holder to your left. Please use this as your ID number whenever 
you are asked for one in the future, not your student ID number. 
 
Pass out DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
Collect DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Like I had said before, today you are going to be working on a task that measures performance while being a member of a 
group.  The participants in this session will be a group and each of you is a member.   
 
Performance on the task today will allow each of you to earn points for your group.  Points are worth chances in a lottery 
for Best Buy gift cards at the end of the semester.  The more points you have, the more chances in the lottery you will 
receive.  40 points equals 1 chance. 
 
Each group member will separately earn points for the group.  At the end of the task, your group’s total earned points will 
be divided equally back to every member to determine lottery chances.  In other words, every group member will receive the 
same number of chances in the lottery based on the group’s total number of earned points. Therefore, the number of chances 




However, your performance will not always guarantee earning points; there is a percentage chance you will earn zero 




I am now passing out a description of the task today. Please read this over carefully and we will discuss it when everyone is 
done. 
 
Pass out TASK DESCRIPTION 
Collect TASK DESCRIPTION 
 
Ok, now that you all have read the description of the task, let me ask you some questions. 
 
What are the two companies asking you and your group to do for them? BRAINSTORM USES FOR AN EVERYDAY 
OBJECT 
 
What do you earn by generating object uses?  POINTS 
 
What are points worth? CHANCES IN A LOTTERY FOR BEST BUY GIFT CARDS 
 
How many points equal 1 chance? 40 POINTS 
 






How is Craig & Co. going to allow you to negotiate with them?  THERE ARE 3 POSSIBILITIES. FIRST, YOU ALL CAN 
NEGOTIATE WITH ME. SECOND, A RANDOMLY CHOSEN GROUP MEMBER CAN NEGOTIATE WITH ME. 
THIRD, THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATION. 
 
Are there any questions about that??? 
 
Will you earn points for every generated use? THERE WILL BE A PERCENTAGE CHANCE YOU WILL NOT EARN 
POINTS 
 
Do you have to work for Craig & Co. after we present the final offer? YOU CAN REJECT CRAIG & CO.’s FINAL 
OFFER AND YOU ALL WILL WORK FOR SMITH & CO AT THEIR RATE OFFERED. 
 
Make sure all questions have been answered correctly 
 
Now that the task is clear for everyone, I would like you to practice brainstorming ideas to get a feel for the task. I want you 
to please help me brainstorm some uses for a “bowl”. 
 
Write BOWL on whiteboard. Write 1., 2., and 3. Ask for 3 uses for a bowl. 
Crazy = Heels of shoes or hat...Normal = Bed risers or Eat out of 
 
Does everyone understand the task? Remember that it’s okay to come up with both normal uses and more unique, unusual 
uses. 
 
(Personal Voice) Now that you have a sense of what the task will be like, I've decided I'm going to have all of you negotiate 
with me. 
(Group Voice) Now that you have a sense of what the task will be like, I've decided I’m going to have one of you negotiate 
with me. 
(No Voice) Now that you have a sense of what the task will be like, I've decided I'm not going to have you negotiate with me. 
 
Go to desk and act out writing offers on OFFER SLIPS 
 
(Personal Voice) I am passing out Craig & Co.’s first offer. Let me know your counter-offer. I will collect them when 
everyone is done. 
(Group Voice) I am passing out Craig & Co.’s first offer. If you were assigned to be your group’s negotiator, let me know 
your counter-offer. If you were not assigned to be your group’s negotiator, complete the question asked. I will collect them 
when everyone is done. 
(No Voice) Since you will not be negotiating with Craig & Co., I am passing out Craig & Co.’s offer. Please complete the 
question asked. I will collect them when everyone is done. 
 
Pass out OFFER SLIPS 
Collect OFFER SLIPS 
 
(Personal and Group Voice) While Craig & Co. considers your offers and creates its final offer, please complete this 
questionnaire. 
(No Voice) Now, please complete this questionnaire. 
 
Pass out PROCESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Let them complete questionnaire items 
WAIT 5 MINUTES 
 
(Personal and Group Voice) Ok, it looks like it is taking longer than expected in figuring out Craig & Co.’s final offer.  To 
save time, let’s have you guys complete the brainstorming task now and afterward Craig & Co.’s offer can be accepted or 
rejected.  Points will still be given to everyone based on which company you all ultimately work for.   
(No Voice) Ok, it looks like this is taking longer than expected. To save time, let’s have you guys complete the brainstorming 
task now and afterward Craig & Co.’s offer can be accepted or rejected.  Points will still be given to everyone based on 






Collect PROCESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
In your packet, you will be given the name of an object and slips of paper. Your task will be to come up with uses for the 
object. Please write ONLY ONE use on each slip of paper and then drop the slip into a box that will be given to you. 
 
You are to keep coming up with uses for the object until a set amount of time has passed in which no one came up with a 
new use. I will let you know when that time has come and the task will end. 
 
***pick up RED BOX AND SHOW TO EVERYONE*** 
 
When the task is done, I will come around and have you empty the contents of your box into this container so we can 
determine how many points your group has earned. So, in other words, all of your slips will be mixed together and I will 
count up how many uses your group has come up with.  
 
Pass out BRAINSTORMING USES PACKETS and BOXES 
Questions? 
You may begin. 
Time them for 12 minutes 
 
Ok, time is up. Can everyone please put together their unused slips and place everything back into the packet so I can pick 
them up. 
 

















Appendix H: Institutional Review Board Approval Letters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
